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Abstract
A shortage of housing affordable to low- and moderate-income households in job-rich
suburbs is one of the biggest obstacles to upward mobility for those households, yet our
understanding of the factors influencing the distribution of affordable housing
development is weak. Focusing on suburbs in Hennepin County, Minnesota, I use
qualitative case studies of eight cities and a statistical analysis of 39 to demonstrate that
the geography of economic incentives to develop affordable units has the strongest
influence. Contrary to common beliefs, opposition of middle-class suburbanites to
affordable housing is a weak factor. Public policy should therefore focus on altering
economic incentives.
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Chapter One: Introduction
For centuries, the idea that the United States is a land of limitless opportunity
where even the most downtrodden can become wealthy if they work hard enough has
dominated the national psyche, drawing people from all parts of the world hoping to have
their chance at material success. Undoubtedly, many have prospered in the United States,
yet the powerful ideal of endless opportunity belies the fact that tens of millions of people
cannot even meet their basic needs and have little chance of upward mobility. Over ten
percent of the population lives in poverty, leaving those individuals unable to afford
simple healthcare, quality housing, and in many cases even enough food to adequately
feed their families. The higher education that would offer the surest opportunity for
escaping poverty is completely out of reach. An even larger portion of society may be
able to meet its basic needs, but faces enormous obstacles to further advancement due to
the high costs of post-secondary education and housing, the replacement of many
moderate-wage industrial jobs with low-wage service jobs, and major debt burdens
incurred from medical and other emergencies.
Among the obstacles, a severe shortage of lower-cost housing is one of the
biggest preventing many households from meeting their basic needs and achieving
upward mobility. The most profound consequences of the shortage are for low- and very
low-income households, which are defined as those earning below 50 percent of an area
median income (AMI) and below 30 percent of an AMI, respectively. They are often
forced to spend such a large portion of their incomes on housing that they are at great risk
of becoming homeless as a result of even a small change in income and have no
possibility of saving money for improved housing, education, or other investments (U.S.
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Department of Housing and Urban Development 2007). Furthermore, with jobs
increasingly being located in suburbs with high housing costs, low-income households
often experience a ―spatial mismatch‖ in which they live at great distance from most jobs,
significantly limiting their employment prospects (Cervero 1989; Kain 1968). In addition,
the only neighborhoods in which many low-income households can afford to live have
high crime, unemployment, and welfare dependency, all conditions that appear to
negatively impact the educational achievement and future career outcomes of children
growing up in those areas (Ellen and Turner 1997). For moderate-income households,
which are those earning between 50 and 80 percent of an AMI, the issue is less about
finding housing they can afford, but rather finding it in the areas with the most job and
educational opportunities. For the city as a whole, having many people commute long
distances from their homes to work increases traffic, which in turn increases pollution
and decreases worker productivity (Cervero 1989).
There is thus a major public interest in expanding the supplies of both rental and
owner-occupied affordable housing, especially in suburban areas. In an effort to expand
affordable housing supplies in suburban areas, county, metropolitan, and state
governments, as well as the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) have enacted many policies such as building public housing,
subsidizing private development, and requiring cities to develop a certain number of
affordable units, yet there remains an acute shortage of lower-cost housing in many of
these areas (Dreier et al. 2001; HUD and U.S. Department of Commerce 2008). One
reason for the shortcoming of many policies may be the poor understanding of affordable
housing development dynamics in suburban areas. Some researchers have explained the

3

suburban shortage as a consequence of economic incentives that cause cities to favor
higher-cost housing and higher-income people at the expense of lower-cost housing
(Fainstein and Fainstein 1983; Gyourko 1991). Others have argued that opposition from
middle-class suburban residents to lower-cost housing, known as Not-In-My-Backyard
syndrome (NIMBYism) is to blame (Danielson 1976). Evidence suggests that both play
a role, but researchers have made few efforts to integrate both explanations across a
metropolitan area and to determine how they interact with each other. Without a
thorough understanding of the factors that influence the development and placement of
affordable housing at the metropolitan scale, we cannot expect policies that try to
encourage development in suburban areas to be effective.
I approach this issue through a study of affordable housing development between
2000 and 2007 in the suburban cities of Hennepin County, Minnesota, the largest and
most populous county in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. For the remainder of this
paper, I will use the definition of ―affordable‖ used by the Metropolitan Council, the
regional government of the Twin Cities metropolitan area. Under the current
Metropolitan Council (2009) definition, a rental unit is affordable if a household earning
50 percent of the AMI can rent it monthly for 30 percent or less of its monthly income.
The thresholds are adjusted for unit size. In 2007, the AMI was $78,500, so an efficiency
unit was considered affordable at $687 per month, a one bedroom at $736 per month, a
two bedroom at $883 per month, and a three bedroom or larger at $1,020 per month. An
ownership unit is affordable if a household earning 80 percent of the AMI spends 30
percent or less of its monthly income on housing costs. In 2007 a unit costing less than
$206,800 qualified as affordable.
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I will draw on the political economy of place framework of development, which
attempts to explain how the interaction of political and economic factors across space
produces particular development outcomes. In all iterations of the theory, there is
recognition that economic forces play an important role in structuring development, but
that politics not based in economic considerations also impact decisions. At the same
time though, the framework holds that neither element is autonomous of the other, but
that instead both influence each other in ultimately shaping what development occurs and
how it occurs. It assumes that the balance of forces affecting development changes over
space, so by comparing the geography of such forces, it is possible to understand why
different development outcomes for affordable housing occur in different cities. Using
the political economy of place framework, I will investigate the following research
questions:

1) What are the major factors influencing the development and placement of
affordable housing at the metropolitan scale?
2) Can resident opposition be broadly effective in blocking affordable housing
development? If so, under what circumstances is it effective?
3) Is there intent by suburban cities to exclude affordable housing?
4) Is there continuity across the metropolitan area of factors that influence the
development and placement of affordable housing that a model can describe?

I have drawn the conclusions of this study from a combination of qualitative and
quantitative research methods. Based on quantitative data about each city‘s production of
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affordable housing between 2000 and 2007, need for additional affordable housing as of
2000, and tax capacity per capita in 2000, I developed an eight-category typology of
cities, and from each category I systematically selected one city on which to conduct a
case study. In each case study, I reviewed city documents and newspaper articles, and
then interviewed individuals familiar with affordable housing dynamics in that city.
Once I completed the case studies, I conducted a correlation and regression analysis of
data for all cities in the study area in order to test conclusions drawn from the case studies.
Based on my results, I advance an argument that largely supports the economic
explanation for the continued shortage of affordable housing but also recognizes and
clarifies a role for non-economic considerations. In Hennepin County, it is clear that
cities generally are motivated first by maintaining or improving their fiscal situation and
keeping taxes low and second by maintaining the architectural status quo for residential
areas. While NIMBYism can in some cases significantly alter or block an affordable
housing development, it is not a major explanatory factor in Hennepin County during the
study period. Only in limited cases when affordable housing is architecturally vastly
different than the housing that is already in the community, is there an actual intent to
exclude it. Because maintaining fiscal standing is the primary concern of most cities,
adequate financial incentives are often sufficient to spur affordable housing development.
However, subsidies appear to favor infill development, which is development that occurs
on previously developed land, in areas that already have large affordable housing stocks,
not greenfield development, which is development on previously undeveloped land, in
the areas with the highest need. In the Twin Cities then, public policy should focus on
better targeting subsidies to the areas of highest affordable housing need. Future research
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should test the applicability of my findings to other metropolitan areas in order to
determine if such a policy would be effective throughout the country.
I present the results and make my argument in five chapters that will follow this
introduction. In Chapter Two, I review literature related to affordable housing. In that
chapter, I demonstrate that there is a suburban shortage of affordable housing, present the
arguments in favor of increasing the supply in suburbs, detail the various explanations for
why development remains difficult, and then introduce the political economy of place
framework upon which I have based this research. In Chapter Three, I present
background information on affordable housing development in the Twin Cities
metropolitan area and Hennepin County, and then explain my data and research methods.
In Chapter Four, I present the results of the eight case studies and the statistical analysis.
In Chapter Five I analyze the results. Finally in Chapter Six, I conclude by offering
policy prescriptions and avenues for future research.
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Literature Review
Introduction
There is extensive research devoted to the broad forces that have shaped and
continue to shape the development of American metropolitan areas, yet the more specific
forces that influence the distribution and amount of affordable housing development are
less clear. Data demonstrate that there is indeed a present shortage of affordable housing
and literature does an excellent job of establishing past economic, political, and social
forces that have helped create this shortage as well as the contemporary reasons why it
should be reduced. However, literature falls short of comprehensively explaining the
continued difficulty of developing affordable housing in suburban areas because the
relevant studies are ultimately outdated, anecdotal, or only partially related to affordable
housing. Consequently, policymakers have an inadequate knowledge base from which to
craft effective policies to encourage future development of both owner-occupied and
rental affordable housing units in suburbs.
The political economy of place framework provides a useful foundation upon
which to build a more refined understanding of the metropolitan dynamics of affordable
housing development. It argues that both economics and politics play an important role
in development and integrates the two by proposing the conditions that influence the
balance of dominance between them. Furthermore, it calls our attention to how such
forces vary over space, making it ideal for use in a geographic study. It therefore
provides a firm basis for investigating the broad range of actors and forces beyond simple
economics that the literature loosely suggests plays a role in affordable housing dynamics
and begins to offer possible explanations for how those forces interact.
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The Case for Expanding Suburban Supplies of Affordable Housing
A dominant feature of the American housing market is a general failure to
accommodate the needs of a significant portion of low- and moderate-income people.
First, the demand for low-income housing far exceeds the supply. In 2005, 5.73 million
households that earned below 50 percent of the AMI where they lived were severely rent
burdened, meaning they spent over 50 percent of their monthly income on rent. HUD
and many housing experts believe that housing costs that exceed 30 percent of a
household‘s monthly income are dangerously high because small changes in income
could easily force the household into homelessness or cause it to go without basic
necessities (HUD 2007). Second, as Table 2.1 below demonstrates, the shortage of
affordable housing is disproportionately acute in suburban areas. It shows the number of
housing units, in thousands, in each monthly cost category in central cities and suburbs.
It covers all metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the United States for the year 2007.
The expected value represents the number of units in each cost category that an area
would have if, keeping the number of total units constant, it had a proportionately equal
share of the units in that category. In every category over $1,000, suburbs have a
disproportionately large number of units. It is important to note that because the
threshold for affordability is based on the AMI of an MSA and AMIs vary by MSA, these
data are not a direct representation of the number of affordable units in each area.
Nevertheless, the data provide a striking picture of the geography of housing costs in the
United States.
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Housing by Price and Location in Metropolitan Areas, 2007
Central Cities
Suburbs
Monthly Housing Cost Expected Actual Percent
Expected Actual Percent
Difference
Difference
Total (in thousands)
31,602
31,302 0.00
52,062
52,062 0.00
No cash rent
556
607
9.17
916
865
-5.57
$1-$499
6,628
7,322
10.47
10,919
10,225 -6.36
$500-$999
10,543
11,862 12.51
17,371
16,051 -7.60
$1,000-$1,499
6,389
6,009
-5.95
10,526
10,906 3.61
$1,500-$1,999
3,278
2,623
-19.98
5,400
6,055
12.13
$2,000-$2,499
1,706
1,313
-23.04
2,810
3,203
13.99
$2,500 or more
2,501
1,864
-25.47
4,121
4,758
15.46
(Source: HUD and U.S. Department of Commerce 2008)

As the data presented above begin to suggest, the need to expand affordable
housing supplies, especially in suburban areas, is strong. One of the principal arguments
in favor of an expanded suburban supply of affordable housing is the spatial mismatch
hypothesis, which Kain (1968) first proposed in a paper about employment of African
Americans in Chicago and Detroit. By demonstrating that they were employed in smaller
numbers than their population size would suggest in areas more distant from major
concentrations of African Americans, he showed that the inability to access housing in
most suburban areas due to discrimination and affordability constraints limited the
employment opportunities of inner-city blacks, resulting in high unemployment and
diminished opportunities to escape poverty. Recent work by McLafferty and Preston
(1996) showed that based on commute times, whites and Latinos in all areas of northern
New Jersey did not experience a spatial-mismatch, whereas inner-city African Americans
did, with women experiencing a more severe spatial mismatch than men. No suburban
groups experienced a spatial mismatch, indicating that simply living in a suburb offers
increased job opportunities. Preston and McLafferty (1999) reinforce the latter finding
by noting that recent spatial mismatch research has supported the contention that spatial
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mismatches impact employment, though the research has been inconclusive on the
strength of the impact.
While the above discussion focuses exclusively on race and gender, its
applicability to low- and moderate-income people is obvious. In fact, Cervero (1989)
demonstrates that in the Chicago and San Francisco areas, there is a spatial mismatch for
many workers and that it is worsening because jobs are increasingly located in suburban
areas while at the same time the housing costs in those suburbs preclude many of the
workers from living there. For low-income people without cars, commuting to suburban
jobs may be impossible, effectively shutting them out of the most vibrant job markets,
just as was the case with African Americans when Kain was writing. Furthermore, a
central part of Cervero‘s argument is that widening spatial-mismatches due to insufficient
affordable housing supplies is the primary factor resulting in increased traffic congestion,
a problem that impacts not just low-income people, but nearly all metropolitan residents.
Finally, essential but lower-wage city employees such as teachers, police officers, and
firefighters may be unable to find housing in some suburbs, which in turn makes it more
difficult for those suburbs to hire such employees (Duncan and Duncan 2006).
The advantages to reducing the spatial mismatch by increasing supplies of
affordable housing in suburbs are therefore very clear. For a metropolitan area as a
whole, it would mean less traffic, which would equate to higher worker productivity, less
pollution, and a higher quality of life for many people. For some cities, it would make
hiring city employees easier. For lower-income people, it may increase their levels of
employment and possibly reduce poverty. Indeed, an extensive study of the Gautreaux
program in Chicago supports such a contention. The program emerged from a lawsuit

11

settlement in 1976 in which HUD and public housing agencies in the Chicago area
recognized that concentrating subsidized low-income housing in certain areas of the
central city was racially discriminatory and agreed to provide Section 8 housing vouchers
so that program participants could live in market-rate apartments in locations of their
choosing in both the central city and suburbs. Through the Section 8 program HUD
subsidizes the rents of low-income households in market-rate apartments by paying the
difference between the rent and 30 percent of the household‘s monthly income. Over
5,000 families have now participated in the Gautreaux program, and those that have
chosen to relocate to suburbs have higher employment and their children do better in
school than those families that choose to remain in predominantly African American
inner-city neighborhoods (Rosenbaum 1995).
A major part of the success of the Gautreaux program is likely the simple fact that
it put many poor individuals in closer proximity to jobs, but it may also be because of less
tangible ―neighborhood effects‖ of relocating to more stable and affluent areas. For
decades, researchers have considered the possibility that the impacts of a neighborhood‘s
socioeconomic status on the lives of its residents exceed what would be expected based
on residents‘ current socioeconomic status because of the varying behavioral norms and
social networks that exist in neighborhoods of different socioeconomic classes.
Proponents of the neighborhood effects argument hold that neighborhoods of higher
socioeconomic class have residents with behaviors more conducive to long-term
educational and economic success and social networks that provide more support and
connections to job opportunities. Ellen and Turner (1997) conducted a review of the
extensive literature related to neighborhood effects and found for adolescents a strong
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positive relationship between neighborhood and educational attainment, a moderately
positive relationship for employment, a moderately negative relationship for sexual
activity and pregnancy, and a weakly negative relationship for crime. Neighborhood
appears to influence adults‘ employment prospects, though there have been far fewer
studies of the topic. Rosenbaum‘s (1995) study of the Gautreaux program is a clear
example of Ellen‘s and Turner‘s broader findings. Not only did adults in more affluent
suburban areas achieve higher employment rates, but their children tended to do better in
school. A later ethnographic study of single women who moved to suburbs as
participants in the Gautreaux program provides support for the idea that social networks
have a tangible effect on opportunity (Rosenbaum et al. 2005). It found that their new
suburban neighbors were far more willing and able than their former urban neighbors to
offer to watch children if they were at work late, provide material assistance in difficult
times, and bring the women to work if their cars were broken. The women felt that the
strong suburban support networks helped them and their children to improve their life
opportunities. Increased supplies of affordable housing in suburban areas would help
many low-income people take advantage of positive neighborhood effects.
Finally, expanded suburban supplies of affordable housing would also be an
indirect but effective way of addressing the problem of concentrated poverty in the
central city. Wilson (1987) argues that the concentration of joblessness and poverty in
small areas makes it extremely difficult for residents of such areas to escape poverty
because ―people experience social isolation that excludes them from the job network
system that permeates other neighborhoods‖ (p. 57) and because concentration ―generates
behavior not conducive to good work histories‖ (p. 60) since residents are accustomed to
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casual work instead of regular long-term work. At the time he was writing, the
concentration of poverty in the United States was peaking, with 21.8 percent of people in
poverty living in census tracts with over 20 percent of the population being in poverty in
1990. By the 2000 Census, that statistic had declined to 19.5 percent, but that is only a
slight decline (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). High levels of poverty, particularly
concentrated poverty, also have a negative impact on central cities as a whole because
impoverished residents require larger quantities of expensive services such as health
clinics and housing than wealthier populations. High service expenditures can result in
fiscal difficulties in cities with high levels of poverty (Orfield 2002). Increased suburban
supplies of affordable housing would help to reduce poverty concentration by providing
new residential locations for current residents of high poverty areas and would ease the
fiscal difficulties that cities with large impoverished populations face by distributing the
need for services more evenly across metropolitan areas.

Toward Explaining the Suburban Shortage of Affordable Housing
A complicated web of social, political, and economic forces helped to establish
and perpetuate the present geography of affordable housing in American cities. Though
small-scale suburbanization began as early as the late 1800s in many American cities, it
began at a massive scale in the years immediately following World War II as a result of
subsidy programs established by the federal government during the Great Depression.
The Home Owners Loan Corporation, established in 1933, refinanced at low interest rates
with longer repayment periods over one million loans that were in default. The following
year, the federal government greatly expanded its involvement in the housing market by
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establishing the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Instead of directly financing
lending, the FHA guaranteed many mortgages issued by private banks, greatly increasing
lending, further lowering interest rates, and extending the repayment period to 25 to 30
years. The net result of FHA programs over the next three decades was a sharp increase
in housing construction and home ownership (Jackson 1985).
Development was, however, spatially uneven and strongly favored white, middleclass households. The FHA engaged in a practice of rating the lending risk of an area,
and refused to guarantee loans in areas labeled as high risk. The FHA considered any
inner-city areas, and any area that was predominantly African American high risk though,
meaning that the FHA favored fringe development in primarily white areas. Private
banks began using the practice, known as redlining, even when they were not taking
advantage of FHA loan guarantees, further restricting development to predominantly
suburban areas. Then, in 1956, President Eisenhower signed the Federal Highway Act,
initiating the construction of the Interstate Highway System. By providing easy access to
the exurban fringe, interstates greatly accelerated suburban housing development,
although due to discriminatory lending practices, living in suburbs continued to be an
option, for the most part, only to middle-class whites (Jackson 1985). With the initially
middle-class character of post-war suburbia established, many suburban municipalities
and their residents actively tried to exclude housing that might attract the poor. In the
decades immediately preceding and following World War II, many states passed
legislation allowing suburban areas to incorporate as municipalities separate from the
central city, and thousands did so. Empowered to determine land-use regulation, many
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restricted minimum lot size and prohibited apartment development in order to exclude
cheaper housing that would attract low-income populations (Jackson 1985).
In recent decades, highway construction has slowed, redlining and discriminatory
real-estate practices have become illegal, and many states as well as the federal
government have made efforts to expand the supply of affordable housing in suburban
areas (Dreier et al. 2001), though the suburban shortage persists. Furthermore, evidence
suggests that municipalities continue to use a variety of methods to exclude or discourage
the development of affordable housing. In 1991, the Advisory Commission on
Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing declared, ―In community after community
across the country, local governments employ zoning and subdivision ordinances,
building codes and permitting procedures to prevent development of affordable housing‖
(p. 3). HUD reiterated the findings of the panel‘s 1991 report in a 2005 report, and added
stringent environmental regulations as another tool that municipalities now use to restrict
affordable housing development.
HUD‘s findings inevitably reflect the urban policy agendas of the presidential
administrations that commission them, yet independent empirical evidence largely
corroborates the claim that suburban municipalities have the ability to restrict the
development of affordable housing. In a review of the extensive literature on this topic,
Ihlanfeldt (2004) concludes that restricting development and enacting characteristics
zoning, which is specifying characteristics of development beyond simply the land use,
increases the cost of housing and thus reduces affordability. The effect may be
particularly strong for rental units, which house the majority of low-income urban and
suburban residents. Levine‘s (1999) examination of growth controls across California
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found that limiting the amount of development that could take place in an area strongly
discouraged local rental housing development and pushed it to less controlled areas. As a
result, minority and low-income residents moved in large numbers to areas with less
stringent regulation, indicating that regulation can effectively exclude affordable rental
housing and accordingly the populations that live in it. However, the patterns described
above are not universal. Glaeser and Gyourko (2002) find that only in certain areas with
very high real-estate values, such as California and the Northeast, upon which many of
the studies described above focus, do zoning regulations have a large effect on housing
prices. The critical point, however, is that municipalities can effectively use regulation to
exclude affordable housing. Two dominant explanations exist in the literature to explain
why suburbs would continue to try to exclude it.
One argues that exclusion is a symptom of fiscal incentives to favor more
expensive housing units. Fainstein and Fainstein (1983, p. 251) succinctly describe the
basis of the economic explanation:
U.S. cities raise the majority of their revenue locally, with property taxes
the most important source. While municipalities differ considerably in the
per-capita magnitude of their expenditures, the system of finance compels
every local state to at least maintain its revenue base by attracting
investment which contributes to the market value of real property.
Moreover, because lower-income populations contribute much less to
revenue than they do to expenditures, local states (even those with
majorities of poor people), have an interest in excluding such households.
Not only does the explanation argue that it is in the economic interests of cities to exclude
low-income people, but it also holds that it is in a city‘s interest to exclude higher density
development, which tends to be more affordable than low-density housing. This results
from the fact that property taxes yield similar revenue for a given parcel regardless of the
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residential density of that parcel, assuming that the parcel is being used to its maximum
potential. For services such as schools and infrastructure whose costs are determined by
the number of people they serve, higher density development, which is often more
affordable, yields less in taxes per person than lower density development. This situation
creates an incentive for cities to raise minimum lot sizes, which can exclude
development. If the city chooses not to increase the minimum lot size, it may have to
raise taxes, which makes it less competitive for attracting businesses and residents, which
in turn has a negative impact on the tax base (Gyourko 1991).
Empirical evidence for the economic explanation is strong. Rolleston (1987)
examined zoning decisions for vacant land in 360 municipalities in northeastern New
Jersey. She found that when a larger portion of a city‘s tax base came from nonresidential uses, which typically yield more taxes per given amount of land than
residential uses, the city allocated less vacant land to any residential uses. Furthermore,
the land that was allocated as residential was more restrictive in the types of units that
could be built on it, which restricted affordability of new units. Additionally, she found
that the ratio of a city‘s total fiscal capacity to the fiscal capacity of adjacent cities is a
statistically significant predictor of how much vacant land a city zones as residential and
how restrictively zoned that residential land is. Cities with smaller fiscal capacities
relative to neighboring cities tended to zone less vacant land for residential uses and the
land that was zoned for residential uses was zoned more restrictively. A study of 132
cities in Connecticut again found that larger proportions of non-residential land-uses
correlated negatively with the amount of vacant land zoned as residential, though the
effect was small (Bates and Santerre 1994). Finally, two studies found that the use of
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impact fees, which theoretically eliminate the fiscal impact of higher density residential
development, increase construction of multi-family and single-family units. This
suggests that affordable units face fewer obstacles to construction when impact fees
remove the fiscal disincentive to allow higher density housing (Burge and Ihlanfeldt
2006a; Burge and Ihlanfeldt 2006b).
The other dominant explanation for the suburban shortage of affordable units is
NIMBYism against affordable housing, which results in local governments attempting to
exclude it. Though NIMBYism outwardly usually focuses on property value, service,
and quality of life issues (Pendall 1999), many observers have long contended that racism
and class biases underlie it. Danielson (1976, p. 6) influentially argued from this
perspective when he wrote, ―Middle-class families commonly equate personal security,
good schools, maintenance of property values, and the general desirability of a residential
area with the absence of lower-income groups.‖ He argues that class is intertwined in the
minds of many whites with race when he writes, ―Large numbers of whites identify
almost all blacks with poverty, crime, broken families, and other undesirable
characteristics of lower-class populations‖ (p. 11). Exclusionary zoning provisions,
which are those that restrict the development of lower-income housing, as well as
stringent building codes, strict code enforcement, and outright exclusion of subsidized
housing helped maintain economic and racial segregation. Though he recognizes that
fiscal considerations may motivate such policies to some extent, he attributes them
primarily to the desire of suburban residents to maintain the economic and racial
character of their suburbs.
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Indeed, there is strong historical evidence and some more recent evidence
supporting Danielson‘s argument. First, at least until the time Danielson wrote his book,
many whites had systematically excluded blacks from predominantly white
neighborhoods. Through practices such as redlining, intimidation, and violence, the
federal government, banks, neighborhood associations, and white individuals had
established and maintained a highly racially segregated residential pattern (Danielson
1976; Massey and Denton 1993; Sugrue 2005). There is significant debate about the
present impacts of racism on real-estate market dynamics, but there is limited evidence
that it may still play a role in NIMBYism. In her study of New Jersey cities, Rolleston
(1987) found that cities that had smaller minority populations than their surrounding
areas had more restrictive residential land-use zoning. There is also evidence suggesting
that class bias may still provoke NIMBY opposition. Bates‘ and Santerre‘s (1994) study
of Connecticut cities found that cities with a smaller population of residents in poverty
than surrounding areas were more likely to zone vacant land for non-residential uses,
most likely to exclude future low-income housing development.
At the same time though, many other researchers have contended that the
expressed objections are a true reflection of the beliefs of residents. The best
documented examples of NIMBYism are those focusing on environmental concerns
posed by facilities such as industrial plants or waste dumps (Schively 2007). In such
cases, it is unlikely that opposition is based on anything other than concern for health and
quality of life within a neighborhood. Fischel (2001) extends the argument for less
nefarious sources of NIMBYism beyond environmental considerations. He presents the
compelling hypothesis that opposition may simply be a rational economic response to the
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uncertainty of whether a new land-use will diminish property values. Though research in
Baltimore County, Maryland actually showed new rental units made affordable through
HUD‘s Section 8 program increased property values slightly in surrounding areas when
they were present in low concentrations, if residents are acting without that knowledge or
are not convinced by it, the objections they express are an accurate reflection of their
motivations (Galster et al. 2003).
Though evidence exists for both arguments, it is extremely difficult to evaluate
residents‘ true motivations in relation to NIMBYism towards affordable housing. Most
importantly, there is very little work focusing directly on NIMBYism and housing
(Schively 2007). The most closely applicable body of work focuses on the placement of
human services facilities such as group homes and AIDS clinics. Researchers in this
field have found, however, that levels of opposition vary greatly by national region and
location in metropolitan areas, as well as the political orientation of communities (Segal
et al. 1980; Takahashi and Dear 1997). The implication is that predicting a NIMBY
response is difficult, and it is therefore difficult to draw conclusions about what motivates
people to mount such a response and what types of people are more likely to do so.
Two of the only studies that do address NIMBYism and housing directly highlight
the difficulty of separating race or class discrimination from more socially acceptable
concerns. The first found that out of 182 housing developments studied in the San
Francisco Bay area, in only one case did someone object to a development on the grounds
that it included subsidized affordable housing. Most complaints focused on
environmental, infrastructural, or aesthetic concerns. However, opposition was 38
percent more likely to emerge when affordable units were included (Pendall 1999). The
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units may have simply presented to a greater extent the issues about which existing
residents were concerned, or residents may have been masking discrimination with more
tenable complaints.
An extended case study of the wealthy New York City suburb of Bedford found
that even though policies meant to maintain a rural aesthetic directly excluded Latino
immigrants and the poor, most residents did not recognize this in interviews and were
hesitant to support changing policies. The authors write in relation to exclusionary land
use regulations, ―[I]n fact the goal is not always social exclusion in itself but to preserve
the ‗look of the landscape,‘ which is central to the performance of particular social
identities that depend on lifestyle, consumption patterns, and aesthetic sensibilities‖ (p.
159). A focus on aesthetic concerns allows residents to ignore the exclusionary impacts
of their political decisions. While their aesthetic concerns are genuine, they are also
intertwined with issues of class and ethnicity of which residents may or may not be
conscious (Duncan and Duncan 2006).
A major issue with the NIMBY argument, however, is that it may not be as
serious of an issue as much of the literature suggests. Lang et al. (2008) cite several
recent real-estate surveys that find that people would support affordable housing in their
neighborhoods if it fit in with the neighborhood. While the authors recognize that
NIMBYism can be an issue, they believe the larger obstacle to affordable housing
development is that housing costs are simply not a major national political issue because
highly visible housing programs are targeted only at a small, very poor group,
minimizing the importance of the programs to the larger middle-class constituency. The
researchers find evidence that housing costs are growing in importance in people‘s
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minds, but at the moment there is little national political will to address the issue of
affordable housing. The author‘s argument cannot negate the NIMBYism explanation,
but it does give reason to approach the argument with caution and skepticism.
Both the economic and NIMBYism arguments provide useful foundations for
analysis of affordable housing dynamics, but the bodies of literature that form them are
problematic for developing a clear understanding of the factors that influence affordable
housing production. First, the majority of the literature for both arguments assumes that
cities have the intent to exclude. In cases of NIMBYism, that assumption is probably
valid, but in the case of economic constraints, a city may simply be responding to an
incentive to have one type of housing development versus another instead of actively
deciding to exclude affordable housing because of the fiscal consequences of having it.
Second, much of the literature, especially that related to NIMBYism, is two to three
decades old. In many other situations, age might not be a problem, but we can expect
attitudes towards racial minorities and lower socioeconomic classes to change over time.
Lastly, almost none of the literature deals directly with affordable housing. Only Pendall
(1999) studies it explicitly, whereas most of the other literature is only partially related.
Consequently, the available evidence does not adequately explain the factors that
influence the quantity and location of affordable housing development. Several
theoretical arguments offer some additional, albeit imperfect, insight into those factors.

Theoretical Underpinnings of Affordable Housing Development
The supposed influence of both economic constraints and political opposition on
the development and placement of affordable housing points to the complexity involved
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in uncovering the dynamics of affordable housing development at the metropolitan scale.
In order to reduce the complexity, it is necessary to begin with a broad analytical
framework that accommodates the dual nature of affordable housing development in
providing a model for the development process. More than any other theoretical
approach, the political economy of place approach can do this. In its most essential form,
political economy of place is the view that in urban development the economy and
politics are not separate spheres operating independently of each other, but rather that
politics is an arena that shapes the economy, while at the same time the economy
constrains the spectrum of political activity and may encourage politics to proceed in
particular directions. By rejecting the idea that the economy is a force independent of
human action, the political economy framework implicitly accepts some level of human
agency in determining the course of development and therefore attempts to address
questions about who or what has power in the development process.
Logan and Molotch (1987) sketch the basic premises of political economy of
place by arguing that a fundamental characteristic of places is that they have both use and
exchange values. Use values are those non-economic benefits that actors derive from a
place, whereas exchange values are the economic benefits. Favoring one often
diminishes the other, so there is a constant struggle between actors interested in use
values and actors interested in exchange values, which ascribes a fundamentally political
character to development. For instance, established residents often oppose new housing
developments on the grounds that those developments will make the area more congested
and diminish the rural character the area had when they moved to it (Pendall 1999). The
developers would profit economically, but the quality of life of existing residents might
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decline. A political struggle also occurs within the group of actors pursuing exchange
values. The authors write (p. 24), ―Property prices go down as well as up, but less
because of what entrepreneurs do with their own holdings than because of the changing
relations among properties.‖ Place entrepreneurs, who are actors with an interest in a
particular geographic place, therefore have an incentive to channel growth in a fashion
that their holdings increase in value, which in turn hurts the value of other place
entrepreneurs‘ holdings. Because government regulates land use, ―the elite can mobilize
the government to bolster growth goals‖ (p. 35).
Beyond simply accounting for the interaction between politics and economics,
political economy of place also succeeds at explaining the geographic variation in that
interaction. The non-uniformity of the geography of affordable housing development
demonstrates that the political economy of place is acting differently across space.
Though Logan and Molotch (1987) offer a very specific group of possible actors
involved in the political economy of place, which I will explain in a moment, an implicit
argument of their work is that each actor‘s influence depends on the strength of its tie to a
geographic place and its relative prominence in that place. Variation in local
circumstances will thus lead to different development outcomes. Whereas an economic
study might require only a macro-understanding of the forces affecting housing
development, a study such as mine focusing specifically on the location of development
must be able to account for this variation. It is for this reason that geographers continue
to draw on the political economy of place framework to explain the geography of urban
policy (Martin et al. 2003), and why I have also decided to do so. However, researchers
do not agree on the dynamics of political economy of place.
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Logan and Molotch (1987) refer to their specific interpretation of political
economy of place as the growth machine. Molotch (1976, p. 309-310) first proposed the
concept when he wrote, ―I speculate that the political and economic essence of virtually
any given locality, in the present American context, is growth.‖ He writes (p. 313) that
growth ―is not the only function of government, but the key one.‖ A key point though is
that governments seek growth because of the presence of a growth machine that demands
it, not because of bare economic necessity. In a later work, Logan and Molotch (1987)
articulate the concept in much more detailed terms. In it, they define the growth machine
as, ―[a]n apparatus of interlocking progrowth associations and governmental units‖ that
stand to gain economically and politically from growth in a particular place (Logan and
Molotch 1987, p. 32). Utilities, businesses, and rentiers, who are actors deriving profits
directly from land, are the most important pieces of the growth machine because of the
substantial profits they directly receive from growth. Governments often view growth as
a means of getting ahead in competition with other cities, so they also have a major place.
Finally, politicians often rely on other growth machine actors for funding campaigns, so
they stand to gain from growth.
From the growth machine idea emerges a highly curtailed picture of individual
agency. Pointedly, residents, who the authors argue derive primarily use values from
place, are not part of the growth machine. In fact, the authors contend that growth
machines pursue ―value-free development‖, which is ―the notion that free markets alone
should determine land use,‖ leading to degradation of the use values residents favor
(Logan and Molotch 1987, p. 32). The authors concede that residents are occasionally
able to form neighborhood organizations that can challenge the desires of the growth
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machine, but believe that typically ―elites use their growth consensus to eliminate any
alternative vision of the purpose of local government or the meaning of community‖
(Logan and Molotch 1987, p. 51). Thus the components of the growth machine are
extremely powerful and residents are very weak. Accordingly, affordable housing
development could occur under a growth machine, but only if it benefited its members.
Affordable housing development is clearly not occurring at the rate necessary to satisfy
demand, and while the growth machine would unequivocally argue that such is the case
because affordable housing development generally must not be in the interests of the
growth machine, it does not explain in detail why the interests of lower-income people
are rarely in line with those of the elite that control development. Stone‘s (1980; 1989;
1993) articulation of regime theory provides a thorough argument related to the question.
An early basis of his argument is stratification theory, in which he argues,
―[P]ublic officials form their alliances, make their decisions and plan their futures in a
context in which strategically important resources are hierarchically arranged – that is,
officials operate in a stratified society. The system of stratification is a motivating factor
in all that they do; it predisposes them to favor upper- over lower-strata interests‖ (Stone
1980, p. 979). Upper-strata interests have a disproportionately large influence because of
their extensive economic resources, role as leaders of large organizations, and social
prestige. Furthermore, because government favors upper-strata interests, it is more
difficult for other groups to even be heard in government, further discouraging their
participation and consequently increasing the power of upper-strata interests. As a result,
upper-strata interests possess systemic power, which is ―that dimension of power in
which durable features of the socioeconomic system…confer advantages and
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disadvantages on groups…in ways predisposing public officials to favor some interests at
the expense of others‖ (Stone 1980, p. 980).
From stratification theory emerges regime theory. Stone (1989) presented the
idea in an applied context in a book about post-World War II politics in Atlanta. He
argues that African American leaders formed a governing coalition, which he often refers
to as a regime, with white business leaders that endured for decades. It retained popular
support by providing occasional benefits to the African American majority such as jobs
or low-income housing construction. Meanwhile, the city government strongly backed
downtown redevelopment programs that led to huge profits for business leaders but
displacement of many African American residents because business leaders had the
power and resources to force government officials to back their interests. Stone
recognizes that the dominance of Atlanta‘s business community is more extreme than in
many other cities, but it does highlight several theoretical points that he explains in detail
in a later paper. He writes (1993, p. 6), ―Urban regime theory assumes that the
effectiveness of local government depends greatly on the cooperation of
nongovernmental actors and on the combination of state capacity with nongovernmental
resources.‖ He goes on to explain (p. 9):
Transaction costs mean that established relationships have great value in
facilitating future cooperation. Hence, once formed, a relationship of
cooperation becomes something of value to be protected by all of the
participants. Furthermore, because a governing coalition produces
benefits it can share or withhold, being part of an established coalition
confers preemptive advantages.
Thus, once a regime exists that favors upper-strata interests, simple inertia helps that
regime stay in power. Nevertheless, even the dominant actors of the regime are
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constrained, which Stone (p. 12) recognizes when he writes, ―[T]he ready availability of
means rather than the will of dominant actors may explain what is pursued and why.‖
However, implicit in his statement is that greater means confer greater power, resulting in
most regimes favoring upper-strata interests to some extent.
Peterson (1981) informs a structuralist interpretation of political economy of place
by arguing that the economic structure rather than the upper-strata or growth machine
interests determine the course of development. His primary contention is that ―[c]ity
politics is limited politics‖ (p. 4). He writes, ―The place of the city within the larger
political economy of the nation fundamentally affects the policy choices cities make. In
making these decisions, cities select those policies which are in the interests of the city,
taken as a whole‖ (p. 4). He later explains, ―[P]olicies and programs can be said to be in
the interest of cities whenever the policies maintain or enhance the economic position,
social prestige, or political power of the city‖ (p. 20). He believes that economic position
is the most important of these three concerns. As a result, he writes, cities can pursue
only to a very limited extent policies that benefit primarily people paying less than the
average person in taxes. Extensive implementation of such policies would result in
increased taxes, which would cause a decline in a city‘s competitiveness vis-à-vis other
cities and a subsequent decline in economic position, social prestige, and political power.
The implications for affordable housing are profound. If Peterson‘s argument held, it
would be extremely difficult for cities to provide any kind of subsidy for affordable
housing, which may be necessary in metropolitan areas in which high land values
preclude affordable housing development. Furthermore, he explicitly states that the
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dominance of economic considerations is a powerful incentive to cities to exclude lowincome people since they require more services but pay fewer taxes.
The critical flaw of structuralism is to assume that growth is the only viable policy
option for cities. Whereas Peterson (1981) argues that development is the best way to
increase a city‘s economic position, Molotch (1976) and Logan and Molotch (1987)
contend that large-scale development can actually be extremely costly. For example,
they point to the massive subsidies cities provide developers in the form of paying to
extend infrastructure to previously un-served areas in order to make construction
possible. Molotch (1990) attacks structuralism from a slightly different angle when he
presents case studies of three California cities in order to demonstrate that cities can
shape development. With varying success, the cities have been able to restrict growth,
and when it occurs, to get exactions from developers to devote to programs such as lowincome housing. Clavel and Kleniewski (1990) do not directly address housing, but
make a similar point. They highlight cities such as Boston and Chicago that, in exchange
for allowing development, were able to get the developers to pay fees used for providing
services to the poor or make commitments to hiring low-income local workers.
Nevertheless, structuralism does make the valuable point that cities operate within a
powerful economic structure that we cannot ignore in any analysis of city policies.
None of the scholars of political economy discussed above extensively addresses
affordable housing development, and each of their approaches have some shortcomings,
but as a whole, they provide an extremely useful theoretical framework with which to
analyze the dynamics of affordable housing development in suburbs. All assume and
convincingly argue that economic forces play a preeminent role in housing development,
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whether they are the economic constraints proposed by Peterson, the profit motive
proposed by Logan and Molotch, or the political advantages conferred by economic
resources proposed by Stone. While their writings represent a range of views on the
importance of the larger market structure versus the economic desires of wealthy
individuals and companies, all maintain that in order to understand any kind of
development, including affordable housing development, it is necessary to understand the
economic forces at work.
Political economy of place also informs the understanding of the political element
of affordable housing development that is often addressed in applied literature in relation
to NIMBYism. All three perspectives discussed above assume that cities can make
decisions based on non-economic considerations, although Peterson questions the longterm fiscal sustainability of decisions that deliberately challenge market constraints.
Logan and Molotch especially, but also to a lesser extent Stone, identify a number of
discrete actors that make political decisions related to development, and all are actors
who either themselves possess large economic resources or have the power to direct the
flow of large amounts of public resources and benefits. In none of the authors‘ views
would small neighborhood groups that might oppose a development be particularly
powerful. As such, the three perspectives within political economy assume that
economics and politics cannot be decoupled. By integrating both the economic and
political elements of the development process, the collective body of political economy
of place literature avoids the shortcomings of applied literature that tend to address one
element of the process in isolation from all others.
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A framework based around three ideas emerges that I will use to evaluate the
dynamics of affordable housing development. First, economic constraints and the profit
motive will always play a role in affordable housing development. Consequently, I will
investigate the nature and magnitude of any constraints, as well as the economic interests
of the actors involved in housing development in each city. Second, there is a political
element of affordable housing development that cannot be fully explained by economics
but is intrinsically linked to it. I will thus also focus on who or what the powerful actors
in a city are and what influences each of them to make the decisions they do related to
housing. In relation to identifying powerful actors, it will be especially important to
reconcile the discrepancy between the applied literature, which argues that NIMBYism is
a powerful force in shaping affordable housing development, and theoretical literature,
which ascribes very limited power to small groups of residents. Finally, the interests of
low-income people, the group most in need of affordable housing, hold little sway in the
political economy of affordable housing development. Accordingly, I will identify the
motives of powerful actors for developing affordable housing and will use those as a lens
into the economic and political considerations that I identified previously.

Conclusion
A synthesis of the literature related to affordable housing development raises a
number of important questions that I will work to address in this paper. First, though
many researchers have noted various constraints on affordable housing development,
they tend to identify a constraint in isolation without assessing the other factors that are
also present. Accordingly, the literature leaves unclear what the major factors
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influencing the development and placement of affordable housing are at the metropolitan
scale. Second, the small place reserved for NIMBYism in the broad models of
development politics means it will be important to assess whether NIMBYism is broadly
effective and, if so, under what circumstances that is the case. Third, the NIMBY
literature uncritically assumes intent to exclude affordable housing, so it will be
important to determine if that intent exists. Finally, the implication that there is
continuity across the metropolitan area of factors that influence development, albeit with
the strength of each factor varying across space, deserves investigation.

The magnitude

of the above questions demonstrates that an in-depth study of affordable housing
dynamics at a large scale is both justified and necessary. Addressing them in the context
of Hennepin County, Minnesota will thus bridge a number of major gaps in our
understanding of affordable housing development.
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Chapter Three: Research Context, Data, and Methods
Hennepin County and the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area
This study focuses on Hennepin County in the Minneapolis – St. Paul –
Bloomington MSA, also known as the Twin Cities. According to the U.S. Census
Bureau (2009b), the MSA is composed of eleven counties in Minnesota and two counties
in Wisconsin (see Figure 3.1 below). It is anchored by the two central cities of
Minneapolis and St. Paul, and has extensive suburban development in the seven
Minnesota counties of Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, and Scott. Since 2000,
the area has experienced moderate population growth. The 2000 Census estimated the
population of the thirteen-county area at 2,968,806, making it the sixteenth largest MSA
in the country. By 2007 the American Community Survey placed the population at
3,208,212, a growth rate of approximately 8.06 percent (U.S Census Bureau 2009a). Of
the seven primary counties in the metropolitan area, Table 3.1 below shows that
Hennepin County was by far the most populous in 2000. None of the primarily suburban
counties exceeded 300,000 in population.

Table 3.1: Seven-County Metropolitan Area Population and Housing Data
Percent Population Percent Housing Units
County
Population, 2000 Growth, 2000-2007 Owner-Occupied, 2000
Anoka
298,084
9.45
83.38
Carver
70,205
26.00
83.48
Dakota
355,904
9.71
78.25
Hennepin (including Minneapolis)
1,116,200
1.83
66.16
Hennepin (minus Minneapolis)
733,582
7.07
74.34
Ramsey (including St. Paul)
511,035
-2.18
63.47
Ramsey (minus St. Paul)
223,884
4.35
74.34
Scott
89,498
41.50
86.46
Washington
201,130
12.60
85.68
(Sources: U.S. Census Bureau 2009a, 2009b)
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Figure 3.1: Twin Cities Metropolitan Statistical Area
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Taken as a whole, suburban Hennepin County is not representative of the seven
counties mentioned above, though it is the most useful for drawing conclusions about
affordable housing dynamics at the metropolitan scale. Even with Minneapolis and St.
Paul excluded from their respective counties, Table 3.1 above shows that Hennepin
County had a lower than median percentage of owner-occupied housing units and
population growth rate. The differences result from the presence of many fullydeveloped suburbs in Hennepin County, of which there are far fewer in the five counties
lacking a central city. Like all of the counties except Ramsey County though, Hennepin
County also has many rapidly developing and semi-rural suburbs. Thus, focusing on
Hennepin County offers insight into the broadest possible range of suburban affordable
housing dynamics, making it possible to generalize findings from it to the broader
metropolitan area in a way focusing on no other county could.
However, caution is necessary when generalizing the results of a study of the
Twin Cities MSA to other large MSAs. Table 3.2 below shows medians of five
demographic and housing values from the 2000 Census for the Twin Cities MSA and the
other 24 largest MSAs in terms of population. As the data demonstrate, the Twin Cities
had less ethnic diversity, higher incomes, a higher proportion of owner-occupied housing
units, and a higher median value of owner-occupied units in 2000. While such values are
a strong indication that its affordable housing dynamics do not represent those of many
other large MSAs, the Twin Cities MSA is a valuable point of comparison for a subset of
MSAs. Demographically and in terms of tenure status, the Twin Cities MSA is broadly
similar to other MSAs with populations under 3,000,000 in 2000. Furthermore, its values
are very similar to several MSAs with similar population sizes, including those of Denver,
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Portland, and St. Louis. Consequently, it is likely that the Twin Cities MSA will have
many similarities to other MSAs with populations just above or below 3,000,000 that are
expanding moderately.

Table 3.2: Medians of National Population and Housing Data, 2000
Twin Cities 25 largest Top 25 MSAs
MSA
MSAs
under 5,000,000
Percent white alone
86.15
73.01
79.11
Median household
income
Percent housing units
owner-occupied
Median value of
owner-occupied units
Median rent

Top 25 MSAs
under 3,000,000
80.77

$54,304

$47,067

$45,502

$46,090

72.44

65.19

66.76

67.95

$139,200

$132,600

$117,450

$115,300

$641

$660

$651
$608
(Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2009b)

Another important factor to consider when comparing the Twin Cities to other
metropolitan areas is the presence of a strong metropolitan government that is active in
affordable housing development. A comparable situation exists only in the Portland,
Oregon metropolitan area. The Minnesota state legislature passed a bill in 1967 to create
the Metropolitan Council, a regional planning authority for Anoka, Carver, Dakota,
Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott, and Washington Counties. In 1971 the Metropolitan Council
formally committed itself to expanding the stock of affordable housing in suburban areas
and in 1973 began administering federal housing programs in suburbs without their own
housing authorities. Also in the early 1970s, it gradually adopted a fair share housing
program in which it set a goal of each city‘s ―fair share‖ of affordable housing units. Its
power expanded in 1976 when the legislature passed the Land Use Planning Act (LUPA),
which required each city to submit a comprehensive plan to the Metropolitan Council,
part of which had to be a housing plan detailing how the city would meet affordable
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housing goals set by the Metropolitan Council. Aggressive efforts by the Metropolitan
Council to enforce fair share provisions resulted in significant expansions of affordable
housing in suburban areas into the 1980s. However, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development severely cut funding for subsidized housing under the Reagan
Administration, and Minnesota state governors during the period were relatively
unsupportive of the Metropolitan Council. Consequently, the Metropolitan Council
stopped enforcing fair share goals, resulting in a decline in affordable housing production
in the Twin Cities suburbs. In response to the shift, legislators passed the Livable
Communities Act (LCA) in 1995, which reiterated the goals of LUPA and established
three grant funds that provided cities money for affordable and life-cycle housing,
pollution cleanup, and transportation-oriented development. Joining LCA was voluntary,
but cities could only access the grants if they joined it and agreed to affordable housing
goals negotiated by the Metropolitan Council and the city (Goetz 2000; 2003).
The impact of the Metropolitan Council and LCA on the regional dynamics of
affordable housing is mixed. On one hand, the political pressure they apply makes it very
difficult for a city to reject outright for an extended period the development of affordable
housing within its boundaries. As I will discuss in the presentation of results, this does
not mean that affordable development occurs in every city. However, it does mean that
cities have less leeway to prevent affordable housing development than they may in a
metropolitan area without a fair share housing program or metropolitan government. On
the other hand, it is possible that LCA has actually reduced the amount of affordable
housing construction that would have occurred between 1996 and 2010, the years for
which it is active, compared to what would have occurred had it not been in effect. Goetz
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(2000; 2003) notes that LCA provides the political cover for a city to stop allowing the
development of affordable units once it meets its goal and to even demolish affordable
units if it has surpassed its goal. Furthermore, he points out that many cities were
successful in negotiating with the Metropolitan Council to reduce the initial goals.
Assuming that affordable housing production rates would have continued at the same
pace they did in the early 1990s, Goetz argues that LCA has resulted in a net reduction in
the number of units that will be produced between 1996 and 2010. His argument
recognizes that LCA has impacted the geography of affordable housing development, but
maintains that the goals the Metropolitan Council set were not high enough.
In addition to the Metropolitan Council and LCA, there is a complex group of
financing sources available from the federal government that help to stimulate and fund
affordable housing development in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. One of the most
common sources for rental housing is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, also known
as Section 42 funding. Funded by the federal government and administered in Minnesota
through the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), a state agency tasked with
providing funding for low- and moderate-income housing, it gives developers an income
tax credit for a percentage of the cost of developing low-income rental units. The
developer then sells the tax credit to investors and uses the money from that sale to
finance the development (MHFA 2009b). Another common program is HUD‘s Section 8
program. Administered through local housing authorities, it allows qualifying lowincome residents to live in private, market-rate apartments. They pay only 30 percent of
their income and HUD pays the difference between that amount and the market rate.
With tenant-based assistance, individuals receive a voucher and they can select any
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housing unit that accepts Section 8 vouchers. With project-based assistance, a housing
unit receives a subsidy that varies depending on the income of the tenant (Goetz 2003).
A number of funding opportunities are also available from sources within
Minnesota. There is a wide variety of other grants and low-interest loans for developing,
acquiring, or rehabilitating affordable rental housing, as well as several MHFA-sponsored
loans to help households purchase a home that is made affordable by reducing or
deferring loan interest (MHFA 2009a, 2009b).1 Individual cities are occasionally willing
to provide funding of their own. A common way is to establish a tax increment financing
(TIF) district, which provides funding to a developer and then pays for that funding using
the increment. The increment is all property tax from the newly developed property
above the amount it was yielding pre-development. The amount of taxes the property
yielded before development continues to go into the city‘s general fund. Frequently cities
require the developer benefitting from a TIF district to include some affordable units if
the development includes any housing (Minnesota House of Representatives House
Research 2008). In the cities researched for this paper, developers typically drew
simultaneously on many of the above funding sources to finance affordable housing.
Assessing the full impact of LCA and other funding sources is beyond the scope
of this study, but it is clear that at the beginning of the study period, the distribution of
existing affordable housing was very uneven. Figure 3.2 on page 41 shows the percent
affordable of total housing units in 2000 by city.2 The data breaks are quartiles.3 Distinct

1

See Appendix One for a detailed table of specific state programs aimed at developing affordable housing.
As explained in the introduction, the definition of affordable is different for a rental unit versus an
ownership unit. Though Figure 3.2 shows the percent affordable of all units, it has applied each definition
to its respective type of unit.
3
All following maps in this section will have quartile data breaks.
2
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regions of affordability are apparent. The cities in the top quartile of affordability are in a
wedge extending north from Minneapolis, as well as the southern inner-ring suburb of
Richfield and the distant western city of Maple Plain. Several other inner-ring suburbs
such as St. Louis Park, as well as Maple Grove and several western cities are also above
the median percent affordable. Less affordable cities include most of the developing
suburbs such as Plymouth and Eden Prairie. The least affordable places are primarily
those cities that surround Lake Minnetonka in the west, as well as the upscale inner-ring
suburb of Edina.

The Research Design
I began this study by establishing the study area within Hennepin County, which
Figure 3.3 below displays. There are two major advantages to studying only Hennepin
County. First, as I explained above, it offers the most complete profile of suburban
affordable housing dynamics short of studying all counties in the MSA, for which there
were insufficient resources. Second, it is possible that differences in county-level
housing policies would introduce a variable into cross-county analyses of cities for which
it would be difficult to control, a problem studying only one county eliminates. Within
Hennepin County, I then limited the study area to only those cities that had at least a
portion of their land area within the Metropolitan Urban Service Area line because it is
very difficult to build housing at the densities required to be affordable outside this line,
which resulted in the exclusion of Hanover. Next, in order to remove the variable of
other counties‘ housing policies, I eliminated all cities not entirely within Hennepin
County, which included Chanhassen, Dayton, Rockford, and (continued on page 43)
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Figure 3.2: Percent Affordable of All Units, 2000
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Figure 3.3: Study Area
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St. Anthony. Next, I excluded Minneapolis because it is the central city and experiences
largely different housing dynamics than many suburban areas. Finally, I excluded
Hassan Township because of data availability constraints for townships. Thirty-nine
cities remain in the study area.
I next compiled data detailing the geography of affordable housing production,
affordable housing need, and municipal tax capacity in order to select case studies. To
represent production, I calculated the percentage affordable of total production, for each
city in the period from 2000 to 2007 using data supplied by the Metropolitan Council
(2009). My study works to explain variation in the production variable. The study
period begins in 2000 because it is the earliest year for which data necessary to detail
both the production and need of affordable housing are available. I end with 2007
because it is the last year for which data about production of affordable housing were
available during the research stage of this thesis.
Need is based on the housing requirements of both potential residents and current
residents. Because one of the central arguments in favor of expanding suburban supplies
of affordable housing is amelioration of spatial mismatches, I used the Metropolitan
Council‘s (2006) Job Proximity Ratio, the best available measure of spatial mismatch for
low-income workers, to quantify demand for affordable housing for people not already
living in the city. The value is a ratio of low-wage jobs within 10 miles of a city‘s center
point to low-income workers in the same area. It is derived from the U.S. Census
Bureau‘s Local Employment Dynamics data set for 2003.4
4

Because the data are from 2003, it is not ideal for this research, but the U.S. Census Bureau does not
publicly provide the data used in the Metropolitan Council’s calculations aggregated at a small enough
scale for me to calculate the value for another year.
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To quantify need for existing residents, I calculated a normalized measure of
surplus or shortage for the existing low and moderate income population in each city
which I have termed the ―supply index.‖ To do so, I first used the Comprehensive
Housing Affordability Strategy (CHAS) database maintained by the HUD to calculate the
number of rental units and the number of owner-occupied units that were affordable in
each city in 2000. Next, I again used the CHAS data to calculate the number of renting
households earning below 50 percent of the AMI and the number of home-owning
households earning below 80 percent of the AMI in each city. I then subtracted the
number of affordable units of each tenure type of housing from the number of households
living in that tenure type needing affordable housing.5 I then divided that value by the
number of households in that tenure type needing affordable housing of that tenure type.
I finally calculated a mean of the rental and owner-occupied supply indices weighted by
the number of households needing affordable housing in each tenure-type category and
multiplied the value by 100.
The resultant supply index value expresses the percentage of low- or moderateincome residents for whom it would be impossible to find affordable housing in the city
of the same tenure type in which they currently live. A positive value indicates a
shortage while a negative value indicates a surplus. This measure does not take into
account situations in which higher-income households instead of lower-income
households occupy affordable units, but since such a situation is dependent on local
market conditions, it is impossible to standardize for study across the county. In contrast,
the supply index is a standardized measure. Finally, I developed a composite measure of
5

There are frequently more households needing affordable units in a city than there are affordable units
in that city, meaning many households are living in units unaffordable to them.
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need, ranking cities based on the job proximity ratio mentioned above, with the city
having the highest ratio being ranked with one, ranking the cities based on the supply
index, with the city having the highest positive value being ranked number one, and then
summing the two ranks. Lower scores indicate higher need.
I then calculated the tax capacity per capita for each city in 2000. Tax capacity
per capita is included because that value will indicate a city‘s relative ability to devote
funds to affordable housing development, whether or not it chooses to do so. To
calculate the value, I collected data for city tax capacity in 2000 from the Minnesota
Office of the State Auditor (2002a; 2002b), and then divided the value for each city by
that city‘s population in 2000. Tax capacity is calculated by multiplying the taxable
value of each property by a factor determined by the type of land use of the property and
then summing those values for the city. Because the state does not cap the property tax
rate a city can charge, it is an imperfect measure of the amount of revenue a city can
generate through property taxes (Minnesota House of Representatives House Research
2009). Nevertheless, it is the only means of comparing the fiscal standing of cities.
Next, I selected case studies by comparing the cities in terms of need, production,
and tax capacity per capita. I first determined the median percent affordable of all
housing development from 2000 to 2007 in each city and labeled each city as higher than
the median or lower than the median. I then determined the median need score and
labeled a city as having above or below median need. Finally, I determined the median
tax capacity per capita in 2000 and labeled each city as being above or below it. Since
there are 39 cities in the study area, one was the median value for each of the three
measures. I assigned the median city to the category in which the numerically closest
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city fell. I then assigned all cities to the appropriate cell of the matrix shown as Table 3.3
below. The geographic distribution of each category is shown in Figure 3.4 below.
Table 3.3: Affordable Housing Matrix
Higher Production /
Higher Tax Capacity

Higher Production /
Lower Tax Capacity

Lower Production /
Higher Tax Capacity

Lower Production /
Lower Tax Capacity

Higher Need
Eden Prairie
Golden Valley
Minnetonka
Orono
Plymouth
Hopkins
New Hope
Richfield
St. Louis Park

Deephaven
Edina
Excelsior
Greenwood
Medicine Lake
Minnetonka Beach
Shorewood
Tonka Bay
Wayzata
Woodland
Spring Park

Lower Need
Bloomington

Brooklyn Center
Brooklyn Park
Champlin
Loretto
Maple Grove
Osseo
Robbinsdale
Rogers
St. Bonifacius
Independence
Medina
Minnetrista

Corcoran
Crystal
Greenfield
Long Lake
Maple Plain
Mound

Once the matrix was complete, I selected case studies based on population data.
The areas with the largest populations and the most rapid growth are those where the
absolute affordable housing stock can increase the most with improved public policies.
Accordingly, within each matrix category, I ranked each city based on its total population
in 2000, with the largest population receiving rank one, and separately on its population
growth rate between 2000 and 2007, with the largest growth rate (continued on page 48)
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Figure 3.4: City Matrix Categories
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receiving rank one. The 2007 population figure is an estimate from the Minnesota State
Demographic Center (2009). I then summed the ranks and selected the city with the
lowest sum for the case study. All of the case study cities are shown in bold in Table 3.3.
I next completed a systematic research process for each case study city.
Comprehensive plans represent a city‘s primary statement of policy on development
issues, including housing, so I first reviewed the two most recent comprehensive plans of
each city. Each of the eight cities had a comprehensive plan that took effect between
1998 and 2000 and had drafted a new plan between 2008 and the present. The earlier
comprehensive plan gives an indication of policies in the earlier part of the study period,
and the later one, though outside of the study period, reflects the trajectory of changes in
attitudes and policy during the study period. After evaluating the two most recent
comprehensive plans, I searched databases of the Star Tribune, the major newspaper
covering Minneapolis and Hennepin County suburbs, and local newspapers for each city
about any articles related to affordable housing development between 2000 and 2007 in
that city. I reviewed minutes from city council and planning commission meetings in
cases where an article provided insufficient information.
Following document review, I visited each city to conduct interviews.6 In total I
conducted fourteen interviews in June, July, and September of 2009 with city staff
members, elected officials, individuals involved in non-profit organizations that provide
affordable housing or advocate for its development, private individuals that have been
heavily involved in affordable housing in their communities, and one person who had

6

See Appendix Two for a sample of typical interview questions.
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worked for a non-profit developer of affordable housing.7 I selected city staff members
by calling relevant departments to speak to housing specialists. I contacted elected
officials and other respondents either by identifying them through newspaper articles or
meeting minutes as being active in affordable housing debates, or by being referred
through previous respondents. For Mound, Minnetrista, and Spring Park I conducted
only one interview each because all had relatively small populations and Mound and
Minnetrista were low-need, low-production communities. Consequently the affordable
housing dynamic in each became very clear through one interview. For Bloomington, I
conducted three interviews because opportunities for additional interviews presented
themselves. All interview respondents provided informed consent on the condition that I
maintain confidentiality. Table 3.4 on the next page indicates a general profile of the
respondents. I have also drawn on three interviews from an earlier study of affordable
housing in the Heart of the City development in Burnsville, a Dakota County suburb, and
three interviews from a study of city-wide affordable housing development in Richfield, a
Hennepin County suburb, in order to reinforce the findings from the case studies.
After completing a full analysis of case study data, I conducted a brief statistical
analysis of all of the cities in the study area to test some of the tentative conclusions that
emerged from the case studies. Using all of the non-ordinal variables from the case study
selection process, as well as the percent affordable of the total housing stock, the percent
growth in population between 2000 and 2007, the 2000 mean of the percent of the

7

I interviewed this individual specifically in relation to his/her role in a particular city in a different
capacity, but he/she also spoke to the broader role as a developer throughout the Twin Cities. In this
paper I will refer to these two roles as if they are two separate individuals in order to maintain
confidentiality because linking the two could potentially disclose the respondent’s identity. The
developer will not appear in the table below providing general backgrounds of the interview respondents.
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population in poverty in adjacent cities weighted by adjacent city population, the 2000
mean of the percent of the population that was minority in adjacent cities weighted by
adjacent city population, the 2000 median household income, the 2000 median value of
owner-occupied units, and the 2000 median monthly rent of rental units, I determined a
correlation coefficient for each variable with the percent affordable of all new housing
development between 2000 and 2007. The additional variables emerged as potential
factors in literature and during the case study research process. I then tested all
independent variables that had a correlation coefficient that was significant at the .05
level for covariance with each other. I excluded from the final regression any variables
with covariance significant at the .05 level except for the variable with the highest
correlation coefficient with the dependent variable. I then developed a linear regression
model to explain the distribution of affordable housing development.

Table 3.4: Profile of Interview Respondents
City
Respondent Affiliation
Plymouth
Interview 1 – Elected official
Interview 2 – City staff person
St. Louis Park Interview 1 – City staff person
Interview 2 – Non-profit staff person with
Project for Pride in Living
Edina
Interview 1 – City staff person
Interview 2 – Private citizen
Spring Park
Interview 1 – Elected official
Bloomington
Interview 1 – City staff person
Interview 2 – Non-profit staff person with
All Parks Alliance for Change
Interview 3 – Non-profit member with All
Parks Alliance for Change
Maple Grove
Interview 1 – Non-profit member with
Housing for All
Interview 2 – City staff person
Minnetrista
Interview 1 – Disclosure would identify
individual
Mound
Interview 1 – Disclosure would identify
individual
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The research method I have used has a number of important strengths that make it
the most appropriate way to approach the research questions at this stage. While a
detailed statistical approach would be useful to effectively develop new housing policies,
the metropolitan dynamics of affordable housing development are not understood well
enough to be able to select variables with relative certainty that no crucial variables have
been overlooked. My primarily qualitative approach takes the steps necessary to begin
building the knowledge base to conduct a thorough statistical analysis. Categorizing
cities by how they relate to some basic descriptors of affordable housing development
geography avoids major assumptions about the factors that are involved in creating that
geography and provides a diverse cross-section of cities with different housing dynamics
and housing policies. By then using a very basic statistical analysis, I largely confirm my
case study findings, suggesting that the study does a good job of explaining the dynamics
of affordable housing development in Hennepin County suburbs.
Nonetheless, there are several important caveats to note about the case study
selection method. First, the comparison of cities is a relative, not absolute, comparison.
Labeling a city as being below the median in a particular measure does not mean that it
does not need to develop more affordable housing units, that its production was
extremely limited, or that its tax capacity is dangerously low. The binary divisions of
each measure contain a wide variety of cities. Nevertheless, having eight categories in
the matrix is meant to limit the within-group variation. The general pattern of geographic
grouping of cities within categories suggests that my methodology has done so. Second,
my measure of need for affordable housing is simple, and as a result, does not fully
describe the geography of need. Need also encompasses transportation connectivity, the
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amount of land available for development, personal preferences of low- and moderateincome households, and many other factors (Metropolitan Council 2006). Incorporating
all of those variables though would have been extremely difficult for a study of this scope.
Moreover, since the focus of this paper is the economic consequences for low- and
moderate-income households of not having an adequate suburban supply of affordable
housing, a measure encompassing jobs is an adequate measure of need.

Geography of Case Study Selection Variables
Production of affordable housing between 2000 and 2007 has several distinct
patterns. Figure 3.5 below shows the percent affordable of all housing units added
between 2000 and 2007. The areas of proportionately highest production are several
inner-ring suburbs with already large stocks of affordable housing, as well as Maple
Grove and several rural cities. Also above the median are most of the other inner-ring
suburbs and the developing suburbs. It should be noted that the inner-ring suburbs have
low absolute amounts of production because there is very little developable land in those
areas. Still, a large portion of the development that does occur is affordable. Most of the
more distant western suburbs are below the median. Edina and Spring Park are the only
suburbs with no affordable production during the study period. Edina and most of the
cities around Lake Minnetonka generally have very high median home prices and rents.
The rural areas with low affordable housing production may have little demand for
development in general, especially low- and moderate-income development.
The geography of need conforms to a largely different pattern. Figure 3.6 shows
the first measure of need, the job proximity ratio. Based on this (continued on page 55)
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Figure 3.5: Percent Affordable of All New Units, 2000-2007
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Figure 3.6: Job Proximity Ratio
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measure the strongest need is in the western and southern inner-ring suburbs, Eden
Prairie, and several of the cities around Lake Minnetonka. Predictably, more distant
areas have less need. The inner-ring suburbs to the north of Minneapolis are also below
the median. It should still be noted however that the majority of cities have a ratio over
one, indicating a lack of enough housing to accommodate low-income workers. The
other measure of need is the supply index, which Figure 3.7 shows. Any area with a
positive value has fewer affordable units than it does residents in need of those units.
The suburbs bordering Lake Minnetonka, as well as Edina and Plymouth, have higher
than median need based on the supply index. Inner-ring suburbs and the northern
suburbs without major lake amenities have lower than median need. Figure 3.8 shows
the composite need score. Lower values indicate higher relative need for additional
affordable units. The areas in the highest quartile of need are several of the cities around
Lake Minnetonka, as well as Edina, Eden Prairie, and Hopkins. Except in the case of
Hopkins, these are all suburbs with very high land values. Most of the other inner-ring
and developing suburbs to the west of Minneapolis have higher than median need. Areas
of lower relative need are the more distant exurban areas, the northern inner-ring suburbs,
Mound, and Bloomington. The distant areas have few jobs, and the nearer suburbs and
Mound already have very large stocks of affordable housing.
The data reveal a moderate mismatch between the geographies of production,
need, and fiscal capacity to develop affordable housing. While need is highest in Edina,
Eden Prairie, and the suburbs at the eastern end Lake Minnetonka, only Eden Prairie had
a percentage affordable of new development over the median. Cities in the second
quartile of need tended to experience production more (continued on page 58)
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Figure 3.7: Supply Index
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Figure 3.8: Composite Need Score
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commensurate with need. A notable outlier though is Maple Grove, which despite lower
need had very high production, both in proportional and absolute terms. Some of the
closer suburbs such as Bloomington and Brooklyn Center with lower need had high
production. The mismatch between the geography of production and the fiscal capacity
is more striking. Figure 3.9 below shows the tax capacity per capita in each city in 2000.
Cities with lower tax capacities per capita tended to have higher percent affordable
production whereas cities with the higher tax capacities per capita had lower values.
In the typology of cities that emerges from the above analysis, the majority of
cities are grouped with similar cities and separated from different cities, suggesting that
the typology is an effective categorizing tool. The ―Higher Need, Lower Production,
Higher Tax Capacity‖ cities all have the highest housing costs. The ―Higher Need,
Higher Production, Higher Tax Capacity‖ cities are primarily developing suburbs that
have somewhat lower housing costs. The ―Higher Need, Higher Production, Lower Tax
Capacity‖ cities are all inner-ring suburbs. The ―Lower Need, Lower Production, Lower
Tax Capacity‖ cities have already large supplies of affordable housing and are mostly
developed. The ―Higher Need, Lower Production, Lower Tax Capacity‖ city of Spring
Park, is very similar except that it is located closer to job centers. The ―Lower Need,
Higher Production, Higher Tax Capacity‖ city of Bloomington is fully developed yet has
a large range of housing types and extensive commercial land use. The ―Lower Need,
Lower Production, Higher Tax Capacity‖ cities are largely rural and have generally
affluent populations. The only category with significant variation within is the ―Lower
Need, Higher Production, Lower Tax Capacity‖ group, which includes inner-ring suburbs,
developing areas, and semi-rural.
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Figure 3.9: Tax Capacity per Capita, 2000
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Chapter Four: Results
Introduction
Through the results we begin to see a political economy of affordable housing
development that is particular to each city, but one that across cities is chiefly, but not
completely, motivated by a diverse set of economic concerns. As this section will
demonstrate, there is much consistency between cities, but we cannot even begin to fully
account for the varying balance of economic constraints and resident opposition between
cities with a linear model. The process involves an intricate interaction of social, political,
and economic forces, many of which are unique to each city. In this chapter, I will detail
these forces in each city while also relating them to the broader statistical analysis. Each
case study will address my research questions as they relate to the case study city. The
following chapter will synthesize and analyze all of the results. The order in which I
present case studies in this chapter is simply a linear progression through the matrix.
Though I conducted the statistical analysis after the case studies, I present it first because
it provides a useful macro-analysis against which to compare case studies. Tables 4.1
and 4.2 present data that are useful to situating each case study in the broader study area.
Table 4.1: Thirty-Nine City Study Area Comparison Values
Variable
Value in Study Area
Population in 1990
651,621
Population in 2000
719,851
Population estimate in 2007
755,122
Percent growth in population, 1990-2000 10.47
Percent growth in population, 2000-2007 4.91
Median household income, 2000
$54,3048
Percent households in poverty, 2000
3.84
(Sources: Minnesota State Demographic Center 2009; U.S. Census Bureau 2009b)

8

For the MSA as a whole; no sufficiently precise data is publicly available for only the study area.
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Table 4.2: Case Study Selection Values
Percent affordable Job proximity
Supply index Need score Tax capacity per
of housing units
ratio
capita, 2000
added, 2000-2007
Study Area
2.38
1.60
-3.88
40
$1,015.57
Median
Plymouth
14.37
1.59
-3.60
40
$1,276.10
St. Louis Park 6.64
1.86
-13.33
31
$1,015.57
Edina
0.00
1.93
44.75
5
$1,627.12
Spring Park
0.00
1.71
56.19
16
$905.56
Bloomington
37.30
1.46
-18.97
51
$1,270.88
Maple Grove
30.16
1.14
-180.72
68
$878.43
Minnetrista
1.37
1.09
16.88
45
$1,589.69
Mound
1.43
1.13
-59.23
66
$834.47
(Sources: HUD 2009; Metropolitan Council 2006; Minnesota Office of the State Auditor 2002a, 2002b)

Statistical Analysis
The statistical analysis suggests that across the study area economic constraints
played a far greater role in shaping the geography of affordable housing development
than did resident opposition. Table 4.3 below shows the correlation coefficients for
independent variables with the percent affordable of new housing units. The supply
index and tax capacity per capita in 2000 co-vary strongly with the total percent
affordable in 2000,9 so they are not included in the regression analysis, the results of
which Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 below show. Most importantly, neither the mean adjacent
poverty nor the mean adjacent minority variables, both of which would capture intent to
exclude, are significant. The median household income, median owner-occupied unit
value, and median rent value would also indicate intent of wealthier or more expensive
cities to exclude, but none are significant. Finally, a negative correlation with the percent
growth variable would indicate that developed communities were hesitant to change their
existing housing composition, but the relationship is positive and not significant. While

9

See Appendix Three for a complete correlation matrix.
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the significance of total percent affordable in 2000 could indicate an impact of resident
opposition, the insignificance of variables meant to capture opposition suggests that
economic constraints are more to blame. The significance of the jobs proximity ratio
probably indicates that a greater commercial presence attracts higher-value housing.
Nonetheless, the weakness of the regression analysis demonstrates the complexity of the
forces influencing the geography of affordable housing development. The following case
studies highlight many of the factors for which the statistical analysis cannot account.
Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix
Job proximity
ratio

Percent
affordable of
new housing
units

Supply index

Tax capacity
per capita,
2000

Total percent
affordable,
2000

-.376*

-.349*

-.367*

.413**

Mean adjacent
poverty

Mean adjacent
minority

Median
household
income, 2000
-.294

Median owneroccupied unit
value, 2000
-.402

Percent
-.139
affordable of
new housing
units
* - significant at the 0.05 level
** - significant at the 0.01 level

-.168

Table 4.4: Regression Summary
R
R Square Adjusted R Square
.509 .259
.218

Median rent,
2000
-.227

Standard Error of the Estimate
13.28097

Table 4.5: Regression ANOVA Summary
Model
Sum of Squares Degrees of Freedom
Regression 2,223.142
2
Residual
6,349.828
36

Mean Square
1,111.571
176.384

F
6.302

Table 4.6: Regression Coefficients
Constant
Total percent affordable, 2000
Jobs proximity ratio

Percent
population
growth, 20002007
.248

Coefficient
19.75
.229
-12.75

t
1.794
2.397
-2.079

Significance
.081
.022
.045

Significance
.005
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Plymouth – Higher Need, Higher Production, Higher Tax Capacity
Located approximately 12 miles northwest of downtown Minneapolis, Plymouth
is an affluent, developing suburb. It has experienced heavy residential development since
1970, as well as large-scale commercial development in more recent years. The decade
of 1970 saw the most rapid relative increase in population, with a 74.9 percent increase
between 1970 and 1980. Growth began to slow in the 1980s, although it remained higher
than the study area as a whole in both the period of 1990 to 2000, during which the
growth rate was 29.5 percent, and 2000 to 2007, during which the growth rate was 8.0
percent (City of Plymouth 2000; U.S. Census Bureau 2009b). Only the northwestern
quadrant of the city remains undeveloped, but it is expected to support the development
of up to 5,775 more housing units before 2030. With only 54 percent of the housing
stock being single-family detached and 46 percent being attached, it has a balanced
housing stock. However, owner-occupied housing dominates, composing 71 percent of
housing units (City of Plymouth 2009). The median value of an owner-occupied unit in
2000 was $197,60010 and the median rent of a rental unit was $895. Median household
income in 2000 was a high $77,008 and the household poverty rate was a low 2.46
percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2009b).
Both Plymouth‘s official documents and its actions suggest a stronger than
average commitment to increasing the city‘s supply of affordable housing. The 2000
Comprehensive Plan explains in unusual detail both the challenges to developing
affordable housing in Plymouth and the reasons the city needs more. For example, it
explains, ―Given the cost of housing in the City and the make-up of the City‘s job market,
10

All dollar values quoted in this section are in terms of the year being referenced.
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high housing costs are likely an obstacle to non-residents who work in Plymouth‖ (City
of Plymouth 2000, p. 5.9). Its 2009 draft plan reiterates the conclusions in the 2000 plan
and includes as one of its three primary housing goals, ―Promote the development and
preservation of a supply of quality housing that is affordable at all income levels and at
all stages of life‖ (City of Plymouth 2009, p. 4.1). As a point of departure, it still accepts
new Metropolitan Council goals as worthy to attempt to achieve, but qualifies its
intention by stating, ―Nevertheless, the City‘s affordable housing goal will be difficult to
meet due to several factors including high land prices, inflationary pressure on building
materials, transportation infrastructure in undeveloped areas of the city and limited
availability of land for commercial purposes‖ (City of Plymouth 2009, p. 4.7-4.8). It is
uncertain and impossible to ascertain whether this means the city has no intention of
meeting the goal or will try but does not expect to meet it because the only people who
know, government officials, would not have revealed that information to me.
Plymouth‘s actions between 2000 and 2007 indicate that the city will make its
best effort to achieve the goal, and has no intent to exclude affordable housing. In 2001,
its Housing and Redevelopment Authority (HRA), which manages the Section 8 program
in Plymouth, actively sought additional Section 8 vouchers to fill a need for additional
affordable rental units (―HRA offers Section 8 rental assistance‖ 2001). Furthermore, the
elected official I interviewed explained that in the development approval process, the city
usually discusses the possibility of including affordable housing. The city staff member
corroborated this point by saying, ―When a developer comes in and they start talking with
the Planning Department about developing some certain site or parcel, I often get brought
into second or third conversations with them just to talk about affordability, because you
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want to make sure the developers know that it is a priority of the city.‖ While there is no
reason to doubt that the city actually pressured developers to include affordable units,
there was no evidence from the study period that the city successfully convinced a
developer that originally had no intention of including affordable units to include them in
its final plans. That point notwithstanding, the city has directly contributed funding to
projects. For Lancaster Village, a 160-unit apartment building with 16 affordable units,
the city provided $2.9 million in financing through city bonds (Thompson 2001). For
both Vicksburg Commons, a mixed-income senior rental development with affordable
units, and Stone Creek Village, a 130-unit apartment building with 34 affordable units,
the city established TIF districts (Thompson 2001; 2006).
The seemingly successful efforts to develop affordable housing belie the serious
economic obstacles that inhibit affordable housing development in Plymouth. The
elected official with whom I spoke explained that as a result of high land values in
Plymouth, ―Really, by and large, our biggest hang up getting it [affordable housing
development] done in Plymouth is funding.‖ The city staff member agreed and added
that the land available in northwest Plymouth will be very expensive to develop because
it has many wetlands and forests. Of the affordable housing development that does occur
in the city, the staff member explained, ―We certainly don‘t see too much single-family
detached projects coming through with an affordability component, and it‘s simply
because of the cost of land issue.‖ Even among those, the staff member believed that
none could have been completed without government subsidies or other non-market
sources. Undoubtedly Plymouth has a strong fiscal standing and could devote additional
resources to overcome economic obstacles if it chose to do so, but the elected official
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expressed the sentiment that raising taxes would be unacceptable to constituents.
Accordingly political will to develop affordable housing is strong compared with other
cities, but it is unlikely that the city will expand its efforts.
Resident opposition has little impact on the unlikelihood that the city will promote
affordable housing development more aggressively. Both respondents noted that
neighborhood opposition to affordable developments had occurred in the study period,
but neither felt that the affordability component was the reason people opposed the
project. The city staff member aptly explained the situation:
The residents – in general, I would say – they come out when a
development, whether it‘s got affordability in it or not, has some impact
on them or there‘s some kind of change going on in an area that they feel
would impact them, in an adjacent site or something. And it‘s pretty much
a mix of the folks that are for it and the folks that are against it. You never
know what‘s going to happen with each development, what they‘re going
to say and the reasons they don‘t think it should be developed or the
reasons they‘re going to say it should be developed. I think a lot of people
just don‘t like to see the open space that they might have enjoyed but
never owned go away.
The staff member later explained, ―We‘ve had developments occur where people have
argued that their property values will decline if affordable housing is built near them,‖
but later explained that in the one case in mind, the city approved the project anyway.
However, the elected official noted, ―Over the years I have just seen less and less and less
resistance.‖ Even if people do oppose affordable housing developments, the elected
official added, ―I think that there may have been some people that maybe kind of thought,
maybe choosing the words, ‗I don‘t want those people in my backyard,‘ but I really think
that it takes a lot of courage anymore to use those words.‖ It thus makes it difficult to
determine the cause of the only instance of major opposition, which was to Stone Creek
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Village, which many surrounding residents opposed on environmental and traffic-related
grounds (Thompson 2002). Whatever the cause though, the dynamics of opposition in
Plymouth indicate that the majority of residents would accept increased affordable
housing development if it did not offend their aesthetic sensibilities.
The presence of moderate political support for existing efforts supports such a
hypothesis. Though residents have rarely come to City Council and Planning
Commission meetings in large numbers to express support for developments because
they include affordable units, both respondents recognized that a small number of people
often do. Furthermore, several faith-based organizations, including Metropolitan
Interfaith Council on Affordable Housing and Interfaith Outreach are active in Plymouth,
both in advocating for approval of specific developments and in lobbying for changes to
city policy that are favorable to affordable development (Hanks and Nichols 2001). A
survey of residents found that a small majority favored development of more affordable
housing, despite most of the respondents not needing affordable housing for themselves
(Thompson 2004). Resident support does not necessarily translate into affordable
housing development, but many developers appear willing to add affordable units, as the
staff member explained in saying, ―I think for the most part, the main developers here in
this metro area and the ones that focus here on Plymouth are very open to looking at
putting in a wide variety of product options in their subdivisions.‖

St. Louis Park – Higher Need, Higher Production, Lower Tax Capacity
In contrast to Plymouth, St. Louis Park is a fully-developed, inner-ring suburb
with a large existing supply of affordable housing. There was a boom in housing
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construction in the late 1930s, and again from the end of World War II until 1960. Until
1960, nearly all of the housing construction was of single-family homes, but following
1960, nearly all construction was of multi-family housing, leading to the current balance
of 55 percent single-family housing and 45 percent multi-family. By 1980, nearly all of
the land in the city had been developed, and given that much of the housing stock is
relatively old, the city has begun to focus heavily on redevelopment (City of St. Louis
Park 1999). By 2007, the population had reached 44,126, and it is expected to grow
slowly if the city succeeds in spurring redevelopment (Minnesota State Demographic
Center 2009). That population had a relatively low median household income of $49,260
in 2000 and a household poverty rate of 5.06 percent. The fact that nearly 56 percent of
the housing stock was affordable in 2000 reflects the lower than average socioeconomic
status of many of the city‘s residents (HUD 2009). Nevertheless, it is important to note
that St. Louis Park had the highest tax capacity per capita of the cities in its category and
does not face issues of decline to the same extent as those cities.
City policy during the study period favored higher-end housing over affordable
housing, though the city still supported affordable housing development and preservation.
For example, in response to the old, generally small-sized, and comparatively lowamenity housing in St. Louis Park, the Comprehensive Plan 2000-2020 explains, ―The
creation of move-up housing [larger, more expensive housing for households ready to
move out of starter homes], either through rehabilitation of existing homes,
redevelopment of blighted properties or brownfields, or development of existing vacant
lots is one of the City‘s highest priorities for its housing policies and programs‖ (City of
St. Louis Park 1999, p. D-9). The plan recognizes (p. D-16) ―there is still an insufficient
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number of units available within reach of lower income families, especially larger
families,‖ and adopts Metropolitan Council affordable housing goals, though it never
suggests that affordable housing is a top priority comparable to move-up housing. The
Comprehensive Plan 2010-2030 – May 2009 Draft (p. D-22) repeats the same goals, and
adds in even stronger language: ―At the present time, the greatest deficit and need is for
the creation and maintenance of detached, owner-occupied single family housing [units]
which are large enough to accommodate families. City housing efforts and resources
should primarily address this need,‖ indicating that move-up housing became an even
higher priority during the study period (City of St. Louis Park 2009).
Written policies seem to suggest that the city does not consider affordable housing
development a priority, but actions show that the city contributed considerable efforts and
resources to the issue during the study period. The city is highly unusual in that it has its
own public housing authority that manages 268 units of Section 8 housing and 159 units
of public housing. During the study period, the Section 8 program expanded by 18 units
and the public housing program expanded by 12 units (City of St. Louis Park 2008). The
city also provided funding to numerous non-profit providers of affordable housing. Most
notably, it provided $140,000 of its Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) in
the form of a grant to Project for Pride in Living (PPL), a non-profit organization based
in Minneapolis, to assume ownership of 11 of the 15 buildings in Louisiana Court, a
dilapidated apartment complex, rehabilitate them, and assure their affordability for 30
years. In 2006 the city provided a $400,000 loan financed through bonds to PPL as well
as assistance in seeking $4 million in additional funds to undergo improvements and
refinancing (Kelsh 2006). Finally, the city has used TIF districts to assist affordable
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developments. For example, in 2004 it established a TIF district for Aquila Commons, a
senior cooperative with affordable units (Kelsh 2004).
The dynamics of redevelopment present the biggest obstacle to developing
affordable housing in St. Louis Park. Most importantly, the extremely short supply of
vacant land typically precludes large-scale development of any kind, meaning the
absolute number of new affordable units was small. Excelsior and Grand, a 344-unit
mixed-use development with 18 Section 8 units, is the only example during the study
period, and it required a challenging acquisition of parcels through eminent domain,
according to the city staff person I interviewed. Furthermore, the staff person noted that
for a new development to be affordable in St. Louis Park, subsidies are necessary. In the
case of Excelsior and Grand and other smaller redevelopment projects, the high costs of
redevelopment made seeking funding with affordable housing requirements necessary,
but when developers did not directly seek subsidies, the city did not tend to require them
to include affordable units because the city prefers higher-value move-up housing over
affordable housing. A large portion of development is thus affordable not because the
city promotes affordable development, but rather because many redevelopments must
draw on subsidies that require inclusion of affordable units.
Nonetheless, the political climate is relatively supportive of affordable housing,
which made the development of a large proportion of affordable housing and the
preservation of existing units possible. The respondent from PPL explained:
I do think the city of St. Louis Park is mindful of the fact that as an older
suburb, there is a portion of the population there – not folks that moved
out from Minneapolis to try and take over the community or whatever
people imagine happens in those situations, but people who live in St.
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Louis Park – who are genuinely poor and need the support of the
community in order to live safe lives.
The respondent had worked in a number of inner-ring suburbs of Minneapolis, and felt
that St. Louis Park had been more consistently committed to affordable housing
development than had others. Louisiana Court is indicative of a very limited opposition
to affordable housing in St. Louis Park. The city staff person explained, ―There was not
resident push-back on that at all because the properties were in pretty tough shape to
begin with, so it was kind of like, if someone can come in and help this out, yeah, we
want that to happen.‖ The respondent from PPL said that the organization chose the site
for exactly that reason, noting, ―When we can step into a place where, somewhat like St.
Louis Park, we can step into a situation that is being badly mismanaged and say we can
do better than that, we‘re a lot more likely to get neighborhood support.‖ Indeed, as the
following statement by the same respondent indicates, there was cautious support:
So, in general, there was pretty good support. I think that there was also
kind of alongside that a real anxiety among some folks, not so much about
introducing low-income or affordable housing, so much as being afraid
that there would be a big change and that there would be a lot more poor
people and that there would be a lot more trouble.
Nevertheless, the concern was not great enough to derail city plans to contribute
significant financing to the project on two occasions and demonstrates powerfully that
there is no government intent to exclude affordable housing from St. Louis Park.
Resident support is contingent though on the project not drastically changing the
character of a neighborhood. The city staff person explained, ―If we were to come in and
do a wholesale redevelopment of the site [a proposed redevelopment site], and put in
concentration of affordable housing, there would be issues.‖ Regardless of the
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concentration of affordable housing, density is a major concern for residents. Aquila
Commons generated some opposition because of its high density, but the developer
removed from the plan 8 of the originally proposed 122 units and changed the location of
the buildings on the property, after which he received approval. As the city staff person
explained ―Some of the immediate neighbors had more concerns about development,
period. The affordability wasn‘t really an issue.‖ The fact that small changes quieted
opposition reinforces the staff person‘s point. Consequently, while affordable
development can occur, it must not represent a drastic departure from the land use in the
surrounding neighborhoods. Maintaining continuity with the surrounding neighborhoods
may have limited the number of affordable units that were developed, but it did not
prevent affordable housing projects from proceeding.

Edina – Higher Need, Lower Production, Higher Tax Capacity
An inner-ring suburb immediately west of southwest Minneapolis, Edina is one of
the most affluent cities in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. It began developing in the
late-1800s and reached full development by 1970. There is now very little land for new
development, so the city is turning to infill redevelopment of land (City of Edina 2008).
As of 2000, 63 percent of housing units were single-family, and of the total housing stock,
73 percent were owner-occupied. The median value of an owner-occupied unit in 2000
was $248,500, and had risen rapidly to $435,000 by 2005 (City of Edina 2008; U.S.
Census Bureau 2009b). The median rent in 2000 was $864. Median household income
in 2000 was $66,019, and the household poverty rate was 3.33 percent (U.S. Census
Bureau 2009b). Relative to the other case study cities, it is an extreme case in that it has
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both a very high need for more affordable housing and ample resources to devote to its
development, but it developed no affordable units during the study period.
City policy in regards to affordable housing development is extremely weak
compared with most other case study cities. The 1998 Comprehensive Plan (p. 2.11)
places as its only objective related to residential land use, ―Protect and maintain the
quality of single dwelling neighborhoods while providing for life cycle housing choice
for all residents.‖ The plan‘s language clarifies its priorities. It uses powerful operative
words such as ―allow,‖ ―provide,‖ and ―restrict‖ related to maintaining the character of
single-family neighborhoods, but it uses much more ambiguous and non-committal
language related to affordable development, such as the stated objective, ―Seek
opportunities to increase the supply of affordable housing as detailed in the Housing
Element‖ (p. 2.11). Edina 20/20, a vision statement created in 2000 and revised in 2003
with the intention of guiding the 2008 comprehensive plan update, offers only one
objective related to housing, which reads, ―Maintain strong residential neighborhoods,‖
and never mentions affordability (City of Edina 2003, p. 3). The Edina Comprehensive
Plan Update 2008 acknowledges in detail that the lack of affordable housing in Edina is
putting pressure on lower-income residents and is preventing many other people, such as
the children of older Edina residents, from moving into the city. However, it only adopts
the Metropolitan Council goal of adding 212 affordable units between 2011 and 2020 and
offers no means of achieving the goal. Because there was no affordable development
during the study period, it is impossible to know what kinds of subsidies the city would
have considered extending for affordable developments.
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Undoubtedly some of Edina‘s reticence to develop robust policies to encourage
affordable housing development is rooted in the major economic obstacles to building
affordable units. A city staff person explained, ―The expense of land is really making it
difficult for developers.‖ Significant subsidies would therefore be necessary for
widespread affordable housing development. A panel discussion among developers
hosted by the city during the most recent comprehensive plan draft process revealed that
developers believe Edina is less willing to provide subsidies than other cities (City of
Edina 2007a). When asked why this was the case, the city staff member responded, ―I
think they haven‘t had to [offer subsidies] in the past because the market has taken care
of it. The city hasn‘t had the need to get involved.‖ Given that interest in development is
high even without incentives to developers, the city has little short-term justification for
spending public money on affordable housing subsidies. Speaking in regards to the
economic constraints though, the citizen suggested, ―It‘s a real obstacle, but other
communities have had high land values and figured out ways to do it [affordable housing]
also. Plymouth, Minnetonka, Maple Grove, Woodbury – they‘re all upscale communities.
You have to assume that land is fairly pricey there also, and they figured out a way to do
it. I think if Edina had the political will, they could figure out how to do it also.‖ The
city can therefore block affordable housing development by doing little to promote it.
The lack of political will goes beyond a simple absence of economic incentives to
also account for intense resident opposition to the higher density housing necessary to
produce affordable units in Edina. In 2004, the Edina City Council established the
Housing Task Force, a panel of private citizens and city staff people to study the issue of
affordable housing in Edina and produce recommendations that would be considered for
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the 2008 comprehensive plan update. In October of 2006, the panel released the Housing
Succession Plan, which concluded that Edina had a serious shortage of affordable
housing. Most importantly, it established the goal of making 500 new units of affordable
housing by 2020, 212 of which would be targeted at households earning 60 percent of the
AMI, 175 at households earning 80 percent of the AMI, and 113 for families earning up
to 115 percent of the AMI. To achieve these goals, it called for the common measures of
increased density in some areas, mixed use redevelopment, and other creative financing
mechanisms. In addition though, it made the radical proposal for an inclusionary zoning
ordinance (Housing Task Force 2006). Inclusionary zoning, not in place anywhere in
Minnesota, requires that developers make a certain percentage of units in every new
development affordable or pay a penalty. Often developers can build at slightly higher
densities to offset the added costs of making a unit affordable. While the Housing
Succession Plan was incorporated into initial drafts of Edina Comprehensive Plan
Update 2008, the City Council ultimately voted in the face of intense public opposition to
remove all of the policy provisions except for the goal of 212 affordable units for
households at 60 percent of the AMI, because the Metropolitan Council required the
adoption of that goal (Smetanka 2008).
The public opposition was wide in scope and focused on several issues. The
private citizen with whom I spoke was a member of the Housing Task Force. The
individual explained that affordability was not the biggest point of opposition, but rather,
―The more serious issue is density. There‘s a strong aversion to high and medium density
housing. I think there‘s a fair number of people that support affordable housing
initiatives.‖ Indeed, in four public comment sessions meant to discuss the housing plan,
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people in each one mentioned a need for more affordable housing while others opposed
higher density. In some cases one person took both positions (City of Edina 2007b-f).
While such opposition might have been genuine, the citizen believed it might have also
masked an anti-affordable housing bias. The citizen explained:
They don‘t want to admit that they‘re classist. They don‘t want to admit
that they‘re carrying out some prejudices. That would be perceived as
racism, so instead you get traffic. You get density. You get
environmental issues, and they‘ll throw those out, and that‘s not to say that
those aren‘t legitimate issues, because they can be legitimate issues, but I
think they come up more when people are talking about affordable
housing, or mental housing, or high-density housing, than it does with
housing types that they perceive to be more desirable.
Furthermore, both the citizen and the city staff person noted that there is a widespread
negative attitude towards rental housing in the city. The citizen even explained, ―Some
of the people on our Housing Task Force were having difficulty accepting rental housing.
They wanted to see us provide all of our affordable housing initiatives through something
that was owner-occupied.‖ That the city responded to public opposition by weakening
proposed affordable housing policies does not necessarily indicate intent to exclude
affordable housing, but does demonstrate intent to exclude the densities of housing
necessary to achieve large amounts of affordable housing development in Edina.

Spring Park – Higher Need, Lower Production, Lower Tax Capacity
At only 210 acres in area, Spring Park is a tiny city uniquely dominated by rental
housing. It began in the 1880s as a Lake Minnetonka resort town, and grew slowly until
after World War II. Then, between 1950 and 1990, its population grew from about 200
to more than 1,500 (City of Spring Park 2008). Population continues to grow slowly,
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with a population of 1,717 in 2000 and 1,926 in 2007 (Minnesota State Demographic
Center 2009; U.S. Census Bureau 2009b). However, the city has been fully developed
since the 1980s, so population increase is a result of redevelopment to higher density land
use. In fact, Spring Park has, on average, the highest housing density of any case study
city. As of 2006, 68.1 percent of the housing units were in buildings with more than 20
total units. Of the total housing stock, 73.3 percent was renter occupied in 2000 (City of
Spring Park 2008). While in 2000 the median household income was a low $36,071, the
median home value was $194,200, and the median rent was $724, the city began
attracting a wealthier population during the study period as it saw property values rise at
unprecedented rates due to its location on Lake Minnetonka. By 2006, the median home
value had risen to $458,990 (City of Spring Park 2008). Although much of its housing
stock remains affordable, the quantitative data suggest that it is struggling to fulfill the
needs of even its existing residents, and it is close to job concentrations in suburbs not far
to the east, hence it is in the higher need category.
Spring Park is the case study city with the least well-developed affordable
housing policies. Its 1998 amendment to the 1991 comprehensive plan makes only one
mention of affordable housing, noting that the wide variety of housing types means that
there are many affordable options in the city. The main thrust of the stated policy was to
maintain the housing stock and tax base (City of Spring Park 1998). Objectives such as,
―Reinforce and improve community identity,‖ and, ―Maintain and protect the tax base for
the city,‖ are emblematic of the plan (City of Spring Park 1998, p. 20). The plan does not
indicate that the city was negligent, but rather that because the city‘s housing stock was
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relatively affordable at the time and it was meeting all Metropolitan Council goals, there
was no need for more detailed policies.
The new comprehensive plan begins to emphasize redevelopment, and for the first
time has an affordable housing section. Interestingly though, the affordable housing
component notes, ―The City believes that with 40 percent of its housing already
affordable that it already has the capacity to accommodate 31 additional households
within its current housing stock‖ (City of Spring Park 2008, p. 126). The plan goes on to
explain that the city believes more Section 8 vouchers will come to it and that job growth
in the city will be less than Metropolitan Council projections (City of Spring Park 2008).
Spring Park thus accepts the Metropolitan Council‘s housing goal of 31 additional
affordable units between 2011 and 2020, but refuses to establish policies to achieve the
goal, believing it can already accommodate additional low- and moderate-income
households. According to an elected official, the Metropolitan Council required revisions
to the first draft of the housing portion, but accepted the second draft, which only added
more detail for why the city felt a 31-unit goal was excessive.
Such an approach does not, however, represent growing hostility to affordable
housing, but rather is indicative of recognition of the significant economic obstacles to
developing affordable housing in Spring Park that the city must now confront because of
pressure from the Metropolitan Council that it did not experience in 1998. Given that no
affordable units were developed in Spring Park during the study period, an elected
official explained, ―The cost of the land is probably the biggest obstacle. The second
obstacle is probably the size of our parcels is small, so to assemble enough parcels to
have a high enough density to be able to create a significant number of units, it‘s tough.‖
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The only two major developments that occurred during the study period demonstrate the
official‘s point to some extent. Both Lakeview Lofts, a 39-unit condominium building,
and The Mist, a 120-unit condominium building, were completed in 2005 as very highvalue developments with no affordable units. The elected official noted, ―There was no
way that the developer could make one of those condominium units, any of them,
affordable without some sort of subsidy. It just never even entered into the equation
because the cost of the land is just so high.‖
Of course, the city could have chosen to subsidize the developments, and in fact
the city created a TIF district for Lakeview Lofts to finance pollution cleanup, but did not
offer funding for affordable housing. One explanation offered in the comprehensive plan
is that increasing land values threaten to force existing residents out by driving up their
property taxes. High-value developments such as Lakeview Lofts and The Mist provide
enough taxes to the city that it can afford to not raise taxes as quickly, enabling existing
residents to stay in their homes (City of Spring Park 2008). Another explanation, though,
is that city residents are opposed to seeing city resources go to subsidize development.
The elected official explained, ―I think that in general any city money going toward any
development project, I don‘t think that would be taken very strongly here.‖ The official
is probably correct because the comprehensive plan explicitly states that residents value
fiscal conservatism, and in a public hearing before the Planning Commission related to
Lakeview Lofts, one resident voiced opposition to the use of city money for pollution
cleanup (City of Spring Park 2004c; City of Spring Park 2008).
Opposition for non-economic reasons also occurred, but there is little evidence
that affordable housing would generate significantly more intense opposition. In
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reference to the two condo developments, the elected official explained, ―Those really
divided the city into those that wanted to keep what was there remaining, and those that
wanted to clean up the area.‖ The official added, ―Because we are a fully developed city,
having any kind of change like that is tough for residents that are long-term residents.
It‘s hard for them to see past what‘s already there and to envision something that might
be different, but better.‖ The issue was not just resistance to change. Rather, the official
explained, ―I think it was just that people didn‘t want that scale of development. Both of
those developments required a significant amount of variances, conditional use approvals
that I think the residents just thought was too much.‖ At a Planning Commission meeting
in which the Planning Commission ultimately recommended the approval of Lakeview
Lofts, ten residents spoke about the project. Five were against it because of the height,
four simply had questions, and only one voiced support for the project (City of Spring
Park 2004c). There are no records of contentious public hearings about The Mist, though
the elected official feels that project was divisive as well. Despite resident opposition
and concern by the City Council about issues such as density, parking, and aesthetics, the
City Council approved Lakeview Lofts unanimously in September 2004 and The Mist
unanimously in November 2004 (City of Spring Park 2004a; 2004b). Furthermore, in
early 2005, the developer of The Mist requested an amendment of the plan to increase the
project from 112 to 120 units, which the City Council approved unanimously despite
frustration with the request (City of Spring Park 2005).
Two points about the outcome of Lakeview Lofts and The Mist are important.
First, they generated opposition for the same reasons many affordable housing
developments generate opposition: they were major projects and were somewhat
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different from the surrounding area, which has slightly shorter buildings. They were
high-value developments though, which suggests that the extra opposition affordable
housing might generate when it is a well-designed project is small. Second, and more
importantly, the City Council approved the projects despite the significant opposition and
only lukewarm support. Barring corruption, which there is no reason to believe existed in
these instances, the only explanation for the council‘s action is that is that it was
responding to the fiscal incentives to allow high-value housing development.

Bloomington – Lower Need, Higher Production, Higher Tax Capacity
Like St. Louis Park and Edina, Bloomington is a developed, inner-ring suburb,
although, owing to a somewhat different course of development, it has more
opportunities to promote affordable housing development. As with both Edina and St.
Louis Park, its peak development occurred in the two decades following World War II,
but because it covers a much larger area than either, it retained some undeveloped land
into the 1980s (City of Bloomington 2009). The population peaked at just over 86,000 in
1990, and by 2007 it had dropped slightly to 85,504, though moderate growth is expected
in the next 20 years (Minnesota State Demographic Center 2009; U.S. Census Bureau
2009b). Almost 57 percent of the total housing stock is single-family detached homes,
most of which was built before 1960, but unlike St. Louis Park, there is a variety of size
in single-family homes since portions of the city developed after 1960. Housing does
remain relatively affordable, with a 2000 median owner-occupied price of $147,000 and a
median rent of $753. Median household income is slightly above average at $54,638,
and the household poverty rate is slightly above average at 4.00 percent (U.S. Census
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Bureau 2009b). Need for affordable housing is lower than in both other cities because
Bloomington offers a large affordable housing stock while at the same time having a
lower job proximity ratio due to many of its jobs being higher-paying corporate jobs.
Similar to other inner-ring suburbs, Bloomington views its most pressing housing
concern as ensuring that its housing stock remains healthy, but it has a stronger
commitment to increasing the affordable housing stock than St. Louis Park. For example,
the Comprehensive Plan 2000 states, ―The foremost housing priority is to keep the
existing housing stock in good condition‖, and indeed one of the three housing goals is to
achieve continued good maintenance (City of Bloomington 1999, p. 3.1). Instead of
simply adopting Metropolitan Council affordable housing goals, the plan also commits
the city to increasing density and facilitating the construction of more affordable rental
units. The plan even goes so far as to specify that 100 units should be for small families,
50 units should be for large families, and 30 units should be for special needs individuals
(City of Bloomington 1999). Of the case study cities, only Edina even attempted to
specify in such detail its affordable housing plans, and ultimately it dropped the language.
The new comprehensive plan makes no substantive changes in policy, indicating a
continued and essentially unchanged stance towards affordable housing (City of
Bloomington 2009). Compared with St. Louis Park, Bloomington can afford to divide its
efforts more evenly between rehabilitation or redevelopment and affordable housing
because its housing stock is significantly more diverse in terms of age and size.
Bloomington used fewer policy instruments than other cities during the study
period to promote affordable housing, but it was effective in encouraging affordable
development. Primarily the city contributed CDBG funds to projects that include
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affordable units. Major examples during the study period include The Crossings at
Valley View, a 50-unit apartment building with all affordable units,11 the Lyndale
Avenue Apartments, a 47-unit complex with 14 affordable townhomes, and Reflections,
two mixed-income condominium buildings with 22 affordable units. The city also
expanded its scattered-site public housing program by six units in 2001 when it
purchased several market-rate duplexes, tore them down, and rebuilt townhomes on the
parcels (City of Bloomington HRA 2008). Many smaller rental and owner-occupied
projects across the city also included affordable units during the period, and received
administrative support from the city in obtaining outside funds. While Bloomington was
clearly conducive to affordable development, it is important to note that The Crossings at
Valley View replaced a 70-unit manufactured home park.12 The Shady Lane Park was
likely the most affordable housing in the city, so the new development actually
represented a net loss of affordable units at the site (Rockwood 2006).
Shady Lane was largely a victim of the constellation of economic constraints
inner-ring suburbs face. A Bloomington HRA staff member enumerated some of the
main economic obstacles in Bloomington:
One is finding land, finding a parcel that is large enough that you can get
the scale that you need in order to do a project that‘s going to make
financial sense, so you can get enough units on it. And secondly, if you‘re
doing affordable [housing], somebody‘s basically got to write a check at
some point to subsidize the development.
11

Residents did not being moving in until 2009, but the city contributed $600,000 in funding between
2004 and 2007.
12
At the request of All Parks Alliance for Change, a tenants union for residents of manufactured home
parks, I will use the term “manufactured home” instead of “mobile home” or “trailer.” APAC points out
that in most cases, the volume of repairs necessary to move a manufactured home from one park to
another is so great that it is financially impossible for the resident to move the unit. Therefore, the
organization believes that referring to them as mobile homes or trailers reinforces the misconception that
residents can easily move to another location if their park is closed.
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As a result, the staff member added, ―It‘s very difficult to do redevelopment in most
cases without some sort of city involvement.‖ As in any city, government involvement
can be a powerful tool for affordable development because as the city staff member
explained, ―If you‘re involved in the project and they‘re coming and asking you for
money – that‘s one reason you want to be involved – is that you can influence what the
project is going to be and if there‘s going to be housing on it, to make sure that some of it
is going to be affordable.‖ Even though the city can pressure developers to include
affordable units, it must also respond to the need to increase its tax base, which makes the
continued existence of cheap but dilapidated housing such as Shady Lane tenuous from a
fiscal perspective. Furthermore, Shady Lane represented a rare instance in which a single
owner possessed a parcel big enough to support a large multi-family redevelopment.
Given the pressure to redevelop Shady Lane combined with city involvement, it is not
surprising both that redevelopment occurred and that it included affordable units.
Indeed, there is evidence that the city had fiscal considerations in mind during the
park closure. The HRA staff person explains, ―It [the closure] was completely private, so
the city was not involved in that at all.‖ However, while the two respondents from All
Parks Alliance for Change (APAC), a manufactured home park tenants union that
unsuccessfully tried to prevent Shady Lane‘s closure, do not dispute the claim that it was
a private transaction, the APAC staff member counters, ―They certainly weren‘t neutral
referees in the process. They had a number of comments along the way that made it
fairly clear that they saw a benefit to the redevelopment project going forward, and we
often received unsupportive feedback in attempting to make the counterargument for why
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that land should be maintained as it was.‖ The APAC volunteer shared this view in
saying, ―The city really wanted that park closed and out of there.‖
Examining the impact of resident opposition, both in relation to Shady Lane and
to other projects, begins to show dynamics very similar to those in cities I have
previously discussed. First, the HRA staff member noted, ―I think there‘s always that
NIMBY factor, but surprisingly we have not seen that as much as in the past.‖ Still, the
staff member added that first, ―People don‘t like rental housing,‖ and second, ―I‘m sure
there are neighborhoods in the city that would fight tooth and nail if we tried to do a[n]
[affordable] project.‖ Both the Lyndale Avenue Apartments and The Crossings at Valley
View generated some opposition ostensibly as a result of density, aesthetics, and potential
traffic congestion (City of Bloomington 2006; Rockwood 2001). Several residents also
spoke in support of The Crossings at Valley View, arguing that it would be superior to a
manufactured home park (City of Bloomington 2006). The City Council approved the
former project unchanged despite the objections, whereas in the latter the developer
lowered the height of one building, after which he received approval. In addition, the
expansion of the scattered-site public housing program received support because, as the
HRA staff member explained, ―I know the neighborhood was very happy to see the –
there was a series of old, crummy duplexes we acquired and took out that were notorious
as far as police calls and bad tenants and that sort of stuff – so they were happy to see that
go.‖ There were no examples of resident opposition derailing projects during the study
period. Opposition then has limited efficacy when projects do not differ significantly
from the surrounding neighborhood.
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Maple Grove – Lower Need, Higher Production, Lower Tax Capacity
Like Plymouth, Maple Grove is a developing suburb with a predominantly
affluent population. Maple Grove remained relatively undeveloped until 1970, after
which residential development began to accelerate. The largest absolute increase in
population of about 18,000 occurred between 1980 and 1990, but growth has continued at
a rapid pace. By 2000, the population had topped 50,000, and by 2007 it had reached
59,458, though large tracts of land remain undeveloped, so the population will probably
continue to grow quickly (City of Maple Grove 2009; U.S. Census Bureau 2009b).
Through the 1980s, most of the development in the city was relatively affordable, and
even by 2000 the median owner-occupied home value was only $155,300, but the city is
rapidly shifting to a higher-end community. Even in 2000, the median household income
was a high $76,111, and by 2007, the median owner-occupied home value was $286,983.
Rents have always been expensive in the city due to a low number of rental units, with
the median rent being $891 in 2000 and $981 in 2008 (City of Maple Grove 2009; U.S.
Census Bureau 2009b). The city thus resembles Plymouth in many ways, although it has
far fewer businesses and jobs due to its more recent development boom, which helps to
explain its lower tax capacity per capita and lower need for affordable housing. Before
moving forward, it is also important to note that Maple Grove‘s matrix category has the
most diverse group of cities in terms of housing dynamics, so even though it offers
important insights about developing suburbs, arguably the areas with the most potential
for affordable housing development, it is not fully representative of its category.
Maple Grove‘s affordable housing policies demonstrate that the text of written
policies can obscure the reality of affordable housing development. The City of Maple
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Grove 1998 Comprehensive Plan presents the standard commitment to affordable
housing of adopting Metropolitan Council goals and also notes that the city was the first
to sign onto the Livable Communities Act (City of Maple Grove 1999). It further states,
―The City of Maple Grove promotes the accommodation of all racial and ethnic groups in
the purchase, sale, rental, and location of housing within the city‖ (City of Maple Grove
1999, p. 82). However, the above plan came at the end of a period in which residents
routinely packed City Council meetings to express their opposition to affordable housing
proposals, even single-family detached Habitat for Humanity homes, singularly and
explicitly because they included affordable units. Moreover, the City Council usually
heeded the opposition of residents during the late 1990s (Goetz 2003). Such incidents
occurred even in 1999 when the City Council approved the plan, which strongly indicates
that the plan does not represent the reality of what the city would tolerate at that time.
The city‘s stated policy did not change significantly between 2000 and 2007, but
the approach to affordable housing development began to align more closely with that
policy. First, the City of Maple Grove 2008 Comprehensive Plan again adopts
Metropolitan Council goals and uses the exact same language in terms of accommodating
all people. But as the high proportion of the units that were affordable demonstrates, the
city began to approve affordable units in far greater numbers. An important indication
that it has shifted to a more proactive approach was the adoption of the Project Points
System in 2004. Meant to encourage better-designed neighborhoods, the system requires
developers to receive a certain number of points, which they obtain by meeting specific
conditions, before they receive approval. Developers receive points for including
affordable units (City of Maple Grove 2009). The city during the study period did not

88

contribute significant financial resources to affordable housing development, although it
was active in helping developers leverage funds from other sources. The major
exceptions were three developments in the Gravel Mining Area, a gravel mine in which
the city is underwriting many site preparation costs to develop a dense, mixed-use
downtown on areas of the mine that are depleted (City of Maple Grove 2008).
The high proportion of affordable units in new developments does not mean there
are not economic obstacles to its development. Speaking about the largest obstacles, a
city staff member explained, ―It‘s simply economics. When you take the land value,
which is something that a city really has very little control over, and the cost to build a
structure, which again a city has very little control over, those things add up to be not
affordable to a family.‖ The staff member added though, ―Things that we do I think well
here is provide an ample amount of land for townhomes, medium density, higher density.
We‘re starting to see more stuff in the Gravel Mining Area that has increased densities,
so that you can have more units per acre, which can help bring down the cost per unit.‖
Still, given that affordable developments in Maple Grove require outside funding, the
staff member added the following challenge: ―Each one of those [funding] sources may
have different standards as far as how big a unit must be or how many bedrooms it must
be, and trying to balance all of those requirements in order to get that grant has, I know,
been exceptionally challenging for some of those folks [developers].‖
Respondents‘ specific insights about developers and housing regulations present
economic and political obstacles. A member of Housing for All, an affordable housing
advocacy group based in Maple Grove, said that during the comprehensive plan update
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process, the organization pushed for inclusionary zoning, similar to that advocated for in
Edina. The individual explained:
The city has been very resistant to that, partially because, I believe,
because they invited what‘s called BATC, the Builders‘ Association of the
Twin Cities, to come to some of those early meetings on that, and BATC,
interestingly, if you talk about the concept of inclusionary housing with
them, they say they support that, but they totally fight it when you say
inclusionary housing and we want to have this in a community.
The city staff member took a slightly different approach, arguing that the city would
support inclusionary zoning if it were implemented on a regional scale, but that now state
law does not adequately allow it, which would mean it would generate a law suit if the
city passed an ordinance instituting it. As a result, the staff member explained, ―So many
of our resources would be spent on dealing with a lawsuit that it‘s not necessarily clear
we would win because of how state law is written, that we‘re better off working with
what we have right now and trying to encourage it [affordable housing] as much as
possible.‖ What is clear is that powerful interests believe inclusionary housing would be
too costly, and the city is unwilling to devote the resources necessary to implement it.
Resident opposition, while still existing, has ceased to be a major obstacle in
Maple Grove, though its strength at one point in time demonstrates that it can be a
powerful deterrent. The member of Housing for All explained that in 1999, opposition
was pervasive, but that now many projects receive approval without incident. A recent
example of an uncontroversial project was Maple Ridge Townhomes, 45-unit, allaffordable development. Even though the only access was through a neighborhood, the
City Council encountered no major opposition and approved it (Miller 2006). As the city
staff member explained, ―I think in a city like Maple Grove where so many people who
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are here are new, they recognize that it‘s growing and that there‘s going to be growth and
that‘s just part of the process for a long time in the city.‖ The statistical analysis offered
no broad support for the hypothesis, but it may be true in Maple Grove. Another project,
Maple Village, a 104-unit, all-affordable apartment complex, generated significant
opposition from a neighborhood abutting the site. Interestingly, residents said they
opposed it because highway noise from Interstate 94 would have exceeded state
regulations and thus negatively impacted the new residents (Miller 2007a). In spite of the
opposition though, the City Council approved the project at the end of 2007 (Miller
2007b). In regards to the project, the city staff member explained:
It is hard to say what their exact motives are without being in their mind,
but there were a number of issues that were brought up that were
seemingly brought up to, in the idea that we‘re trying to help the people
out that are going to be living here and make it better for them, that were a
little bit over and above what you would normally expect. There seemed
to be an impression of trying to stall and block it from happening using
these things.
The Housing for All member stated that in private meetings with residents, ―It was more
quote on quote ‗those people,‘ they won‘t fit in, that type of thing.‖ What changed so
that such opposition was ineffective is unclear. It is possible that once some affordable
projects were developed at the end of the 1990s, affordable housing began to seem less
threatening. What is important though is that Maple Grove demonstrates that expensive,
developing suburbs can be leaders in affordable housing development.

Minnetrista – Lower Need, Lower Production, Higher Tax Capacity
Almost 25 miles from downtown Minneapolis, Minnetrista is a predominantly
wealthy, sparsely populated, semi-rural city. It did not incorporate as a city until the
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1970s, and it continued to have a relatively small population of 6,234 in 2007. Though
the population is small in comparison with most of the case study cities, it has been
experiencing rapid relative growth. Between 1990 and 2000, the population grew almost
27 percent, and between 2000 and 2007 it grew over 43 percent. In 2000, 1,382 out of
1,443 housing units were single-family units, and 95 percent of all units were owneroccupied. Housing costs are very high, with the median owner-occupied unit being
valued at $278,500 and the median rent at $1,083 in 2000. Income is also high, with a
median household income in 2000 of $90,347. The household poverty rate in the same
year was a low 2.39 percent (City of Minnetrista 2009; U.S. Census Bureau 2009b). As a
result of the general wealth of its residents and its distance from major job centers,
Minnetrista‘s need for affordable housing is slightly lower than the study area median.
City policies related to housing make affordable development very difficult. The
1999 Comprehensive Plan states as its first housing goal, ―Preserve Minnetrista‘s rural
character‖ (City of Minnetrista 1999, p. 5.6). The plan does present the possibility of
higher density multiple-family housing, but it only uses the terms ―allow up to‖ and
―consider‖ in relation to such development and does not make a definitive statement
calling for it. Indeed such development has not yet occurred. In the 2008
Comprehensive Plan Review Draft, it accepts the Metropolitan Council‘s affordable
housing goal of 209 new affordable units between 2011 and 2020, but calls for
cumulative density in newly developed areas to not exceed the Metropolitan Council
minimum density of 3.0 units per acre. The high density area that will likely
accommodate all of the affordable units is in one area of southeastern Minnetrista. The
city has no HRA, public housing, or assisted housing (City of Minnetrista 2009).
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Part of the explanation for Minnetrista‘s scant development of affordable housing
is a set of economic restraints related to its rural character. Land values are very high,
partially as a result of natural amenities such as Lake Minnetonka and the rural character,
but also because of the city‘s low density limits. Notably, Mound, a case study city
bordering Minnetrista on the east in which 58 percent of the housing stock was affordable
in 2000, suggests that affordability is possible around Lake Minnetonka. Despite the
partially self-created constraints, it may be difficult for Minnetrista to increase density
and maintain its high tax capacity per capita. As the respondent from Minnetrista
explained, ―The primary goal is to maintain the existing quality of housing. People
always say it‘s kind of a euphemism for, ‗We want high-end housing.‘ The reason for
that is tax-base reasons. A place like Mound has a lot of commercial, so you kind of have
to make a choice. Do you want to encourage and do whatever you can to keep high-end
housing, or do you want to allow commercial?‖ The respondent later explained, ―They
[city councilors] have intentionally chosen not to have commercial, and have
intentionally chosen to encourage high-end housing by squeaking up those lot sizes.‖
At the same time though, much of the existing population has a strong desire and
interest in restricting any type of growth in Minnetrista, but especially growth in
affordable housing. The respondent explained that residents in Minnetrista are prone to
react negatively to high-density and lower-cost housing, but then added, ―The residents in
Minneapolis are just as concerned about their property values and the perception of
density and the perception of renters as the people out here. They really are. They just
have less to lose.‖ City Council action strongly reflects the desire to maintain low
density. Beyond enshrining that value in the last two comprehensive plans, it has
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disputed density regulations with the Metropolitan Council. In 2006, the Metropolitan
Council sanctioned the city for developing below the 2.2 unit per acre limit prescribed for
cities such as Minnetrista. According to the respondent, the city councilors resented the
action, but had no choice but to amend the 1999 Comprehensive Plan to accept a 3.0 unit
per acre overall density floor after 2008 (Schwarze 2006). In addition, two developments
that were proposed during the study period only received preliminary approval after
lowering the density to the minimum allowed by zoning (Schwarze 2007a; 2007b). One,
Halstead Pointe, received preliminary approval slightly after the study period13 for a plan
above the maximum density, but the site is a manufactured home park and city councilors
expressed a desire to ―clean up the park.‖ Some nearby residents, however, were
concerned about the density (Schwarze 2008).
Minnetrista‘s approach to affordable housing would be concerning if it were a
more populous area with a higher need for affordable housing, but it is unlikely that such
a place with opposition like that in Minnetrista would exist in the Twin Cities.
Minnetrista clearly intends to exclude the kinds of housing that could be affordable,
though it will probably permit some due to Metropolitan Council pressure. That intent,
however, flows from a desire to maintain a rural aesthetic. Such a desire would not exist
closer to the central cities where there would be a heightened need for affordable housing.
Minnetrista therefore represents a highly unusual situation that while informative, is not
as problematic as exclusion in Edina.

13

I am including this example because it represents the culmination of a process that occurred almost
completely within the study period.
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Mound – Lower Need, Lower Production, Lower Tax Capacity
Mound is a fully developed suburb on the western edge of Lake Minnetonka with
a large supply of affordable housing. The city began as a lake cabin retreat in the 1920s
and 1930s, and then grew rapidly in 1950s and 1960s. By 1980, the city had become
fully developed, so the limited amount of new building is typically infill redevelopment
(City of Mound 2007). Seventy-seven percent of the housing is single-family detached,
and 80 percent of the total stock is owner-occupied (City of Mound 2007; U.S. Census
Bureau 2009b). The population in 2007 was estimated to be 9,753. The median
household income in 2000 was $60,671, and the percent of households in poverty was
3.34, making it comparable to the study area average. Housing costs in Mound are some
of the lowest in the study area, with a 2000 median owner-occupied home value of
$140,300 and a median rent of $581 (U.S. Census Bureau 2009b). Accordingly, as the
case study selection data indicate, Mound fulfills the affordable housing needs of most of
its residents. Moreover, its distance from most job centers means that it does not have a
strong imperative to increase its affordable housing stock.
The city‘s official policies are supportive of affordable housing development,
although they do not recognize additional affordable development as a top priority. The
only goal in the 2000 Mound Comprehensive Plan related to housing states, ―Provide
opportunities for all residents, supporting creative multi-family housing while
emphasizing the construction and maintenance of high quality, single-family dwelling
units‖ (City of Mound 2000, p. 3.3). None of the six policies listed to achieve this goal
mention affordability, and one specifically states, ―Maintain the predominantly single
family housing base throughout the city‖ (City of Mound 2000, p. 3.3). Given the
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general affordability of Mound‘s housing stock, however, such a goal would not have had
the effect of inhibiting affordable development. The 2010 Mound Comprehensive Plan
Draft takes largely the same approach, though it uses slightly more forceful language in
support of affordable housing in the single housing goal, which reads, ―Promote and
encourage the provision of life-cycle housing opportunities for all residents, supporting
creative multi-family housing while emphasizing the construction and maintenance of
high quality, single-family dwelling units‖ (City of Mound 2007, p. 3.2). One of the six
policies specifically calls on the city to ―[p]romote and support the development of new
affordable housing units‖ (City of Mound 2007, p. 3.3). Because so little affordable
development occurred in the study period, it is difficult to know which tools the city
would use to promote affordable housing. The city does, however, have an HRA that
manages a public housing building, and it has used TIF districts for other projects, so
there is some precedent for active involvement in the development process.
The biggest challenge to developing new affordable units will be finding land and
providing funding. As already stated, there are very few vacant parcels of land in Mound.
Second, the city‘s small tax capacity per capita limits its ability to directly provide
funding and induces it to favor more expensive development. A large project that began
during the study period and is aimed at redeveloping the downtown is emblematic of this
challenge. The respondent in Mound explained:
Our downtown redevelopment plan focused on a wide range of housing,
different styles of housing, mixed use, vertically integrated, but it was
anticipated that, for the project to work, it would be of a medium to higher
value. It had to make the numbers work. At that time, there was not an
affordable component included in there, and it wasn‘t proposed from the
developer as well. And I think there‘s also some thought process that
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substantial improvement in the tax base of downtown Mound would be a
benefit.
Speaking more generally about affordable housing in Mound, the respondent stated,
―We‘ve not done an affordable housing project here yet, mainly because I‘m not certain
that the city has the financial wherewithal to do it by itself. We would need some sort of
partner.‖ Of course, the city could raise taxes, but it is unlikely that it would do so.
Nevertheless, because of the low value of land in Mound, new development is
occasionally affordable even without subsidies. Village by the Bay, a project with 99
housing units, some of which are affordable, was built during the study period. It
provided the bulk of the affordable units added during the study period. A for-profit
developer built the project without using public money.
Public opposition to affordable housing did not prove to be a major issue during
the study period. According to the respondent, Village by the Bay generated some
concern among nearby residents because it was going replace a closed school that some
of the residents would have preferred to become a community center. The opposition
was not stiff though, and the project went forward. The primary reason opposition was
minimal is probably that on one side of the project is a major road, so even though the
surrounding neighborhoods are composed of single-family homes, it is doubtful that the
residents would have been surprised to hear that higher density development was being
proposed. Also, the fact that all of its units are market-rate may have mitigated potential
opposition. Village by the Bay‘s easy approval combined with the comprehensive plan
shows that there is no intent to exclude affordable housing from Mound.
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Chapter Five: Analysis
Introduction
From the rich body of data provided by the statistical analysis and the case studies
it is possible to draw general conclusions about regional affordable housing dynamics.
The case study suburbs do not represent the full range of city types in Hennepin County,
and therefore do not precisely represent the dynamics in other cities. However, they do
provide a good approximation by encompassing a broad spectrum of housing dynamics
and correspond well to the county-wide statistical findings. Consequently, they can
represent more general trends across Hennepin County and the Twin Cities region. In the
following sections of this chapter, I will highlight such trends as I integrate and analyze
my results to address the four research questions presented in Chapter One.

Research Question One: What are the major factors influencing the development and
placement of affordable housing at the metropolitan scale?
With shocking consistency, the results indicate that the local economics of
housing development combined with a political calculus centering on developers‘
interests and taxation are the strongest predictors of the distribution of affordable housing
development. In every case study except Mound, respondents cited high land values as a
deterrent to affordable development. Mound though is a low-need area with limited
development potential, so it is insignificant to the broader development of affordable
housing that land is comparatively cheap there. In addition, respondents from fully
developed suburbs facing possible fiscal decline such as St. Louis Park and Mound
expressed that their cities have a strong incentive to promote higher-value development,
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just as Fainstein and Fainstein (1983) argue. Finally, the fact that the percent affordable
of the total housing stock in 2000 is the most statistically significant variable in
predicting affordable development in the study period, and is positively correlated, offers
support for high land value precluding increased affordable development.
Likewise, affordable housing thrives where it can make a positive contribution to
a city‘s fiscal standing. In the cases of Bloomington and St. Louis Park, redevelopment is
the only way to grow the tax base, and many of the necessary subsidies for
redevelopment require the inclusion of affordable units. In Plymouth, Stone Creek
Village occupied a marginal site that probably would not have been developed by a forprofit developer, and in Maple Grove, affordable housing has proven an effective way to
get development in the Gravel Mining Area. As I will discuss at length in the following
section, resident opposition only has the ability to shape affordable development, but
does not play a major factor in the metropolitan geography of that development.
We cannot view economic constraints as autonomous forces though, since the
case studies strongly demonstrate that those constraints are inextricably linked to local
politics. The respondent from PPL explained, ―I don‘t want to say it‘s [land value] a nonissue because of course more expensive suburbs will drive up the cost, but I will say that
I think there are some public agencies who see the value of having affordable housing in
some of the more expensive suburbs.‖ Moreover, the private citizen from Edina noted
that comparably expensive suburbs such as Plymouth and Minnetonka have managed to
encourage large proportions of affordable development whereas Edina has not. Indeed,
the Metropolitan Council has stated that it sees value to having affordable housing in all
areas, and will subsidize a development regardless of its location. The federal
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government and state agencies will also subsidize development in most areas. Such
points demonstrate that other contingent forces also play a role.
In several case study cities, one force was the politics of taxation circumscribing
the economic realm in which city governments made decisions. Minnesota law does not
cap the property tax rates cities can charge, so hypothetically a city could simply raise
taxes in order to generate the revenue necessary to subsidize affordable development.
Elected officials are accountable to residents though, and most residents are unwilling to
pay higher taxes, especially for housing that would not personally benefit them.
Respondents in Plymouth, Spring Park, and Minnetrista communicated such a constraint,
albeit to a different extent in each city. While the issue did not come up in other cities,
there is no reason to believe that it does not restrict the action of city governments. The
emergent theme echoes Peterson‘s (1981) argument, which states that cities have a very
limited capacity to fund projects that do not contribute to their overall economic
wellbeing and that they cannot raise taxes significantly above those of other cities
without driving out residents and businesses. Peterson, however, assumes that the same
dynamics prevail throughout a metropolitan area, whereas my results show that the
electorate of each city has different expectations regarding taxation. My research does
not attempt to explain in-depth the politics of taxation in each city, though doing so
would surely allow a more precise analysis of affordable housing dynamics.
The role of subsidies both supports and complicates Peterson‘s thesis in relation
to affordable housing. He recognizes that goals such as affordable housing development
are important, but given the economic constraints cities face, feels that only higher levels
of government can accomplish them. Indeed, higher levels of government such as the

100

Metropolitan Council, MHFA, and HUD partially funded all large-scale affordable
housing projects in the case study cities. However, most of the same projects also
received city funding through bonds, TIF, and other instruments. Plymouth, the city with
the most aggressive subsidy policy, has a solid fiscal standing and appears to only be
getting stronger, not weaker as Peterson would predict. Furthermore, the use of higher
government subsidies that required affordable units was only absolutely necessary in
Bloomington and St. Louis Park, where developers would be unable to build without
subsidies due to high redevelopment costs. In other cases, affordable development was a
result of a non-profit developer voluntarily drawing on such subsidies or city pressure to
include affordable units. In those cases, development would not have included affordable
units without subsidies, but it could have gone forward in some other form with purely
private funding. An element of politics then is involved in most decisions to use
affordable housing subsidies, as evidenced by the PPL respondent‘s statement that, ―One
of the things I‘ve seen in some suburbs is a city council who is persuaded to participate in
some funding, in some positive way in supporting affordable housing, largely because
there is one or two people on that council who understand housing is an issue and end up
being advocates, and if those people leave the council, the attitude and opinion can
change just that fast.‖ Any comprehensive geography of affordable housing then must
include an understanding of the politics of leaders throughout the region.
Focusing only on the perspective of cities and their residents though obscures the
impact of developers on affordable housing dynamics. First, the example of BATC
resisting inclusionary zoning proposals in Maple Grove indicates that the Twin Cities
development community is broadly opposed to stringent affordable housing regulations

101

because of the impact they would have on profitability. Second, respondents often speak
of having to encourage or require developers to include affordable units, with the obvious
implication that they do not originally include them in their plans. Taken together with
the previous point, it is clear that developers do not view affordable housing development
as being in their best interests. Finally, that numerous projects received approval despite
significant opposition signals that in many city governments a pro-growth attitude
aligned with developers‘ interests trumps the opposition of some residents. By figuring
prominently in city policies, developers‘ interests probably result in a smaller overall
production of affordable housing than would otherwise occur. Such a dynamic is a
perfect example of the growth machine described by Logan (1976) and Logan and
Molotch (1987), and accordingly presents a more complicated picture than Peterson of
why insufficient amounts of affordable housing are developed in most suburbs. Where
developers are more active, namely developing suburbs, we can expect their interests to
shape development to a greater extent than elsewhere.
A final political consideration is that businesses and residents place little pressure
on cities for affordable development, and also have little ability to stop it. While many
businesses support the idea of affordable housing because many of their workers need it,
they do not appear to invest much effort into its development. For instance, in Plymouth
and Maple Grove, the strongest advocates for affordable housing were faith-based
organizations, not businesses. Except in the case of executives from a hospital under
construction in Maple Grove, businesses did not appear at contentious city council
meetings to voice support for affordable projects. One possible reason proposed by the
Maple Grove city staff person was that most businesses are headquartered outside of the
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Twin Cities, and so have little connection to local housing matters. In regards to
residents, only in Edina was there significant concern among some residents that housing
was unaffordable, and still that did not prove strong enough to encourage development
during the study period. At the same time, only in Edina and Minnetrista is it possible to
demonstrate that resident opposition or the threat of it blocked affordable housing
development, a point I will address at length in the next section. As Logan and Molotch
(1987) would predict then, residents and non-place-based businesses have little impact on
housing dynamics.

Research Question Two: Can resident opposition be broadly effective in blocking
affordable housing development? If so, under what circumstances is it effective?
There is irrefutable evidence in the study area that resident opposition can block
development, but there are so few examples of it that it becomes clear that the
NIMBYism argument cannot explain the distribution of affordable housing development.
Maple Grove stands out among the case study cities as the only one where resident
opposition to affordable housing for the sole reason that it was affordable proved in
recent years to significantly limit development, and even it eventually embraced
affordable housing. Edina and Minnetrista are examples of where the broader politics of
development have limited affordable housing development by precluding the types of
land uses that could financially support such development. The critical point then is that
it would be erroneous to discount the potential impact of resident opposition on
affordable development.
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Nonetheless, opposition or the potential for it had little effect in the study area on
the geography of affordable housing development. First, we would expect either or both
of the means for percent of the population of adjacent cities being in poverty or being
minority to have a negative correlation to the percent affordable of total development if a
desire to exclude was indeed influencing development, as Rolleston (1987) argues. The
correlations for both though are slightly positive and statistically insignificant. Even
median household income, for which a negative correlation might indicate that suburbs
with more affluent populations were attempting to exclude affordable housing, is not
statistically significant. Indeed, the case studies revealed very little stiff opposition. The
only project that generated an overwhelmingly negative response that appears to be
strongly related to affordability was Maple Village in Maple Grove, but the City Council
approved the project without changes. Edina is another example of opposition, but due to
being fully developed, there are relatively few opportunities for affordable development
in the city anyway. We would expect opposition in Minnetrista, but it is a low-need area,
so the opposition is relatively unimportant.
Many affordable housing proposals generated some opposition, but affordability
was almost never what residents were protesting. In Plymouth, St. Louis Park,
Bloomington, and Maple Grove, residents frequently cited traffic and density as reasons
to oppose a project. The PPL project in St. Louis Park generated some concern for the
effect that bringing poor residents into the area might have, but it never evolved into
outright opposition. In Bloomington, opposition resulted in the developer of The
Crossings at Valley View reducing the height of the building, and in St. Louis Park it
resulted in the developer of Aquila Commons reducing the density of the buildings and
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reorienting them, but those are the only examples of a project changing after reaching the
formal proposal stage. In all cases it is possible, as Pendall (1999) suggests that concerns
about traffic, density, and aesthetics are simply masking an anti-affordable housing bias,
and indeed numerous respondents believed that this was the case. However, that The
Crossings at Valley View and Aquila Commons successfully mitigated opposition by
addressing those concerns and that even high-value projects such as Lakeshore Lofts and
The Mist in Spring Park generated opposition nearly identical to that of the affordable
projects suggests that anti-affordable housing bias is not the primary motivation of
residents. Whatever the motivations for opposition, city councils did not reject any
affordable housing projects that reached the formal proposal stage.
The question then arises of who has the power to influence decisions related to
affordable housing. It is easy to dismiss residents through both Peterson‘s (1981) and
Logan‘s and Molotch‘s (1987) models, but the role of residents in the political economy
of affordable housing development is more complicated than either model would suggest.
First, respondents in every city were aware of resident preferences for lower-density,
owner-occupied housing. Second, the non-profit employee respondents and the
developer both recognized that opposition is something that developers must strategically
plan to counter. Third, only in the case of The Crossings at Valley was a new project
much higher density than in the surrounding neighborhood. Finally, in no cities would
projects be immediately identifiable as affordable housing in the way that inner-city
housing projects developed in the 1960s and 1970s were.
The above points suggest that anticipated resident opposition ensures that
developers plan affordable housing projects to be on carefully chosen sites and to blend
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into surrounding neighborhoods in order to mitigate resident opposition. When projects
do not significantly disrupt the status quo, city councils are unlikely to deny them due to
the economic advantages development can bring and the political pressure from the
Metropolitan Council to encourage affordable development. Such a dynamic points to a
restricted form of Stone‘s (1989; 1993) regime theory. Middle-class homeowners form
the political base of most of the case study cities. Inasmuch as their preferences
circumscribe government action and influence developers, they constitute a weak regime
that can require some consideration for the use values of their homes. An earlier study I
conducted of Heart of the City, a large mixed-use development including affordable
housing in Burnsville, Minnesota, a Dakota County suburb bordering Bloomington to the
south, reinforces the finding. Though there was minimal resident opposition to including
affordable units, the city adopted extremely high aesthetic standards for the buildings and
used the term ―workforce housing‖ instead of ―affordable housing‖ in an effort to
preempt potential resistance. Residents did not directly impact the decision to include
affordable units, but their known preferences influenced the character of the development.
It is possible that the threat of resident opposition broadly limits affordable
housing development in suburbs. Indeed, the PPL respondent explained that a potential
project in Richfield never went forward to a proposal because resident opposition was
already stiff. Evaluating the possibility throughout the metropolitan area is very difficult
though, since it involves uncovering what might have occurred but did not. However, it
is unlikely to be a major explanatory factor. A respondent from a secondary study that I
conducted in Richfield, a suburb similar to St. Louis Park but in more danger of fiscal
decline, believed opposition may have been motivated by racial and class prejudice to the
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poor Latinos that would primarily have resided in the project, but another respondent
noted that the project was high-density in a single-family neighborhood. Opposition was
thus not inconsistent with the opposition seen in the case study cities. Furthermore, we
would, in general, expect to see stronger resistance from residents in city council
meetings throughout the county if the possibility of opposition was a significant deterrent
to even proposing projects. Nevertheless, potential opposition probably does influence
the development geography within cities by limiting the number of viable sites.

Research Question Three: Is there intent by suburban cities to exclude affordable
housing?
The results do not reveal widespread intent to exclude affordable housing.
Plymouth, Maple Grove, and Bloomington actively sought new affordable housing.
Bloomington did support the removal of some of its most affordable housing in the Shady
Lane Park, which indicates that suburbs may exclude the cheapest and most unsightly
housing, but it hardly indicates a deep-seated intent to exclude. St. Louis Park and
Mound were less active in seeking new affordable housing, but were supportive of
preserving their current affordable housing stock and welcomed some new units.
Although Spring Park saw no affordable development, there is no reason to believe that it
would attempt to exclude it. In contrast, Edina and Minnetrista did demonstrate intent to
exclude the kinds of housing that could be affordable in those cities, but not necessarily
intent to exclude housing on the basis of affordability. In both cities, residents were
highly opposed to the increased density that would be needed to allow for affordable
units. It is possible that residents have strong anti-affordable housing biases, but it may
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also be that they have a strong value of a particular aesthetic that is not compatible with
affordable housing, as Duncan and Duncan (2006) describe in the upscale New York City
suburb of Bedford. That there is only weak evidence, at best, to support intent to exclude
affordable housing in the most upscale suburbs in the sample highlights the weakness of
the NIMBYism argument in explaining the continued shortage of affordable housing in
suburban areas.

Research Question Four: Is there continuity across the metropolitan area of factors that
influence the development and placement of affordable housing that a model can describe?
As the general weakness of the statistical model indicates, a mathematical model
would be difficult to develop, but several continuities do exist across the study area. The
model‘s weakness is not surprising given the wide deviations from the regression just in
the case study cities. For instance, Plymouth had a low percentage of affordable units at
the beginning of the study period, yet it still developed a high proportion of affordable
units over the next seven years. Further research could probably develop a stronger
mathematical model, but the heavy importance of difficult-to-quantify political factors
would continue to hinder the model‘s explanatory power. Consequently, focusing on
qualitative continuities among cities would be a more productive approach to future
research. My research has revealed five major continuities that will be useful in
developing a model of affordable housing development. First, all cities try to maintain
and enhance their fiscal standing. Second, in cases when affordable housing represents
redevelopment, development of a challenging site, or development that would not have
otherwise occurred, it can be fiscally beneficial to a city even if it requires subsidies.
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Third, the only cities absolutely requiring subsidies for development are fully developed
areas not in the upper echelons of land value. Fourth, most suburban electoral
constituencies do not demand affordable housing. Fifth, it is difficult for residents to
successfully oppose a project when it does not deviate significantly from the surrounding
developments in appearance and density. Accordingly, to develop a model, it would be
useful to catalog areas where affordable development would be advantageous to the fiscal
standing of a city and would be aesthetically similar to other development in the city.

Implications for Political Economy of Place Theory
Structuralism tempered by elements of a growth machine and regime politics
emerges as the political economy of affordable housing development. Suburbs must
maintain their fiscal standing and so are not keen to spend tax dollars on affordable
housing unless that housing has a positive impact on their fiscal statuses. Evaluating
where such a positive effect can occur goes a long way to understanding the geography of
affordable housing development. At the same time, developers are a powerful influence
in most city governments, and many resist calls for mandated affordable housing
development, limiting affordable development across the metropolitan area. The regime
of middle-class residents has little say in whether most projects get approved, but that is
primarily because the threat of its opposition ensures that the projects are of a sufficiently
high quality to receive approval. There is no widespread intent to exclude affordable
housing, but the economic and political structures in which suburbs exist restrict
affordable development to varying degrees depending on the local context.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
A detailed analysis of affordable housing dynamics in Hennepin County‘s suburbs
both supports and challenges the conventional narratives of affordable housing
development. The economic forces identified by many authors are a powerful factor in
shaping the geography of affordable housing development. However, economic
constraints are not simply the product of autonomous market forces, but reflect the
political and economic interests of developers and middle-class residents, two important
suburban constituencies. My research then is a strong testament to the false nature of the
dichotomy between politics and economics that pervades the applied literature. Also
striking, though, is the weak impact of resident opposition on affordable housing
development. Residents certainly shape the types and intra-city locations of projects
developers propose, but they are highly ineffective at blocking projects outright when
they do not deviate significantly from surrounding areas in terms of density and
appearance. Unusually strong opposition does block projects, but most residents are
either not so strongly opposed or are unwilling to mount the effort necessary to block the
project. The finding that resident opposition is weak thus seriously undermines the
applicability of conventional NIMBYism literature to affordable housing development.
A more fruitful approach would analyze the more subtle impact of anticipated opposition
on the distribution of affordable housing development.
The findings are both heartening and discouraging in the context of improving
affordable housing policy to better promote development in the areas needing it most.
More than any other finding, the weakness of resident opposition highlights the broad
latitude policymakers have to develop more aggressive public policies. Even though
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policies would be unlikely to generate widespread enthusiastic support among suburban
residents, most of those same residents would not obstruct the policies out of opposition
to having more affordable housing in their cities. This finding completely alters the
perception of the political climate within which policymakers believe they are operating.
It is also promising that, owing to the preeminence of economic forces in affordable
housing development, more financial resources and a refined incentive structure could go
a long way towards achieving a more optimum quantity and distribution of such
development. The necessity of an economic remedy is simultaneously very discouraging.
It would, of course, require certain levels of government to devote more resources to
affordable housing, which is not an important political issue to most people. It is difficult
to imagine a scenario in which a majority of the population would support increasing
taxes or cutting funding from other programs to support affordable housing development.
However, just as the finding that resident opposition was weaker than expected was
surprising, more support may exist than we currently believe.
Certain policies could be effective in the Twin Cities regardless of the amount of
additional funding available. Counties, the Metropolitan Council, state agencies, and the
federal government should refine their subsidy structures to offer larger subsidies in
higher need areas than lower need areas. The only places affordable housing subsidies
were absolutely necessary for development to occur were in developed, inner-ring
suburbs, whereas the use of subsidies in higher need developing areas relied on
developers voluntarily drawing on them or city councils demanding their use. A forprofit developer under no pressure could have declined subsidies and developed a project
with no affordable units. A more compelling subsidy in higher need areas could spur
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more developers to draw voluntarily on the subsidy. Governments could accomplish
such a policy with no additional funding by shifting the way they spend current levels of
resources, though it would be more effective with additional resources. Nonetheless, it
would be important to compensate for reductions in suburbs in danger of fiscal decline
that rely on redevelopment subsidies for new projects that expand the tax base. However
policymakers refine subsidies, they should couple those efforts with a streamlining of
subsidies into a smaller number of programs that are easier to access. Doing so would
reduce the expertise needed to develop affordable housing, making more for-profit
developers willing to participate.
If a politically favorable climate existed, several additional policy changes would
vastly expand affordable housing development in the Twin Cities. Inclusionary zoning
would be the most direct way to address the presently low quantities of development,
though it would require the state legislature to change state law to permit inclusionary
zoning, and would also probably require state action to require all cities in the Twin
Cities metropolitan area to adopt it. The state legislature could also take into account
each city‘s relative success with affordable housing development when determining
future aid payments to cities. Those cities that are less successful or less willing would
lose a portion of their aid, or if they receive no aid, would have to pay a penalty, and
those that are successful would receive a bonus. Doing so would offset the fiscal benefits
of avoiding affordable housing development and the fiscal consequences of pursuing it.
With both measures though, the state would need to increase its funding to cities in order
to effectively address the underlying economic structures that impede affordable housing
development and to avoid charges of creating an unfunded mandate.
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Potential city-level policies are more modest. Most importantly, city
policymakers should recognize that in most instances, their constituents will not vote
them out of office for approving well-designed affordable housing developments, and so
they should not resist or stall such projects. Cities should also be more proactive in
identifying sites where affordable housing is feasible, because there are non-profit
developers anxious to find good sites. Finally, cities should not resist new metropolitan
area-wide affordable housing policies when those policies address the underlying
economic forces that may make it advantageous to favor higher value development.
Most cities would benefit from such policies in increased funding.
There is little reason to believe that economic factors would not also prevail in
other metropolitan areas in the United States, but more research is needed to understand
if the policies that would be effective in the Twin Cities would be effective nationally.
The role of resident opposition is the area most in need of attention. Maple Grove in the
1990s demonstrates that when it is severe, resident opposition can block affordable
housing development. Consequently, my research cannot rule out the possibility that
resident opposition is a powerful explanatory force in other metropolitan areas lacking
strong government support for affordable housing development. Furthermore, my
research does not address the reasons opposition is not strong in the Twin Cities. Strong
federal policy would require an understanding of the dynamics in all metropolitan areas,
and if opposition is indeed a problem in some, it would require knowledge of strategies
for reducing broad opposition. The Twin Cities could provide an ideal environment for
studying the latter question.
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Uncovering the factors that produce different policy outcomes from seemingly
similar cities would be a boon to policymaking in both the Twin Cities and elsewhere.
Altering the economics of housing development may be the clearest path to success in
increasing affordable housing development, but the fact still remains that it will not solve
a portion of the problem. The political beliefs of residents towards issues of taxation and
government involvement in social policy as well as the personal leadership qualities of
elected officials appear to affect the distribution of affordable housing development, yet
my study only began to address such factors, and theory offers few potential hypotheses.
A detailed political geography of the suburbs would provide invaluable information that
would enable policymakers to tailor policies to unique local circumstances and thus
account for the explicitly political aspects of development that more resources and a
refined incentive structure will not change.
Armed with the information we need to effectively intervene in an undeniably
pressing issue, there would be no excuse not to develop new affordable housing policies.
Benefits would be spread across society, with low-income households gaining access to
jobs and beneficial neighborhood characteristics previously out of reach, moderateincome households being able to access the best schools possible, and all people facing
less traffic, commute time, and pollution. Our cities would be more fiscally secure,
which would in turn safeguard all households‘ financial investments in their homes. The
sacrifices would be few, limited only to a small possible increase in taxes and the
willingness of residents to reevaluate their personal views on living in a socioeconomically diverse area. It is within our reach to create a more equitable housing
geography in the Twin Cities and the rest of the United States. Let us now do it.
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Appendix One: Affordable Housing Financing Programs
Major Programs for Rental Housing Development Available in Hennepin County
Program Name
Low and Moderate
Income Rental Program
(LMIR)
Flexible Financing for
Capital Costs
Housing Tax Credit
Program

Type of
Assistance
Amortizing
first mortgage
loan
Deferred loan

Description

Tax credit

Provides Tax Credits to reduce federal income tax liability for
qualifying property owners who agree to rent to low and
moderate income tenants
Loans for acquisition/rehabilitation, debt restructuring or
equity takeout

Preservation
Affordable/Rental
Investment Fund
Housing Trust Fund
Capital
Housing Trust Fund and
Ending Long-Term
Homelessness Initiative
Operating Subsidy

Deferred loan

Housing Trust Fund and
Ending Long-Term
Homelessness Initiative
Rental Assistance
Ending Long-Term
Homelessness Initiative
Fund

Grant

Economic Development
and Housing Challenge
Program

Deferred loan

Home Rental
Rehabilitation

Deferred loan

Publicly Owned
Housing Program

Deferred loan

Rental Rehabilitation
Loan Program
Bridges

Amortizing
loan
Grant

Family Homelessness
Prevention and
Assistance Program
(FHPAP)

Grant

Deferred loan
Grant

Deferred loan
and grant

Mortgage funds for new construction/substantial
rehabilitation of rental housing, or refinance/debt-restructure
Loan provided in conjunction with LMIR loan

Development, construction, acquisition, preservation, and
rehabilitation of low-income rental housing
Operating subsidies are available to fund two forms of
operating expenses:
1) Unique costs of supportive housing developments that are
critical to both the economic viability of the building and
households being served
2) Revenue shortfall to reduce the difference between costs
of operating and the rents that tenants are charged
Rental assistance is available in two forms:
1) Tenant-based rental assistance program funds
2) Sponsor-based rental assistance program funds
Funds for tenant and sponsor-based rental assistance,
operating subsidies, acquisition, rehabilitation, development
or construction for permanent supportive housing for
households experiencing long-term homelessness
Provides loans for housing which will support economic
development activities or job creation/retention. Fifty percent
of funding must be awarded to proposals with non-state
resources (local governments, philanthropic, religious, or
charitable contribution(s)).
Federal HOME funds for the rehabilitation of existing rental
properties in MHFA‘s jurisdiction area. No interest deferred
loan. 5-year forgivable loan available for requests less than
$100,000.
Provides funds for development, construction, acquisition,
and/or rehabilitation. Reserves, operating expenses, and
certain costs cannot be financed with state bonds.
Funds for rehabilitation loans for existing rental properties
utilizing authorized local lenders
Rental assistance grant for persons with serious mental illness
waiting for a permanent housing subsidy
A flexible grant program designed to assist families, youth,
and single adults who are homeless or are at risk of
homelessness
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501c(3) Bonds

Deferred loan

Non-Profit Capacity
Building Revolving
Loan Program

Short term
predevelopment
loan
Deferred loan

Family Housing Fund

Local Housing
Incentives Account –
Metropolitan Council

Grant

Development, construction, acquisition, and rehabilitation of
low-income rental housing primarily for long-term homeless
households. At least 90% of the units financed with 501©(3)
Bonds must serve long-term homeless households and those
at significant risk of long-term homelessness. The remaining
10% can serve homeless households or those at risk of
homelessness.
Funds for predevelopment costs in conjunction with the
development of low and moderate-income housing

Funds for the seven-county Twin Cities metropolitan area.
Priority will be given to developments or redevelopment
projects that provide supportive housing for families with
children, projects that create affordable, healthier, more
energy-efficient housing through implementing the Minnesota
Green Communities criteria and/or projects that create
housing with strong linkages to jobs and/or transit
Funds for the seven-county Twin Cities metropolitan area.
Grants may only be awarded to cities, which in turn pass the
fund through to assist affordable housing developments.
(Information quoted from MHFA 2009b)

Major Programs for Ownership Housing Development in Hennepin County
Program Name
Minnesota Mortgage
Program

Providing
Agency
MHFA

Community Activity
Set-Aside Program
Home Ownership
Assistance Fund
HOME Homeowner
Entry Loan Program

MHFA

Homeownership
Opportunity Program
Land Trusts

MHFA

Non-profit provision
of affordable
ownership units

Non-profit
agencies (e.g.
Habitat for
Humanity)

MHFA
MHFA

West Hennepin
Affordable
Housing Land
Trust

Description
Loan for low- and moderate-income first-time homebuyers
with possibility of a deferred, zero interest loan to cover
closing costs and the down payment
Loan for low- and moderate-income first-time homebuyers
Deferred, zero interest loan to cover closing costs and down
payment for households earning below 60 percent of the AMI
Deferred, zero interest loan to cover closing costs and down
payment for low- and moderate-income households buying a
home in targeted zip codes
Loan for moderate income households to purchase and
rehabilitate vacant homes or homes on verge of foreclosure
Agency purchases land and low- or moderate-income
household purchases house or both parties take a share in both
land and house and sign agreement dividing any returns when
house is sold; keeps house affordable for owner-occupants
because they are insulated from land value appreciation
Organizations provide affordable ownership units

(Sources: Homes Within Reach 2009; MHFA 2009a)
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Appendix Two: Sample Interview Questions
1) Can you tell me about your involvement in -------- city government?
-Why did you originally decide to get involved?
-What influence, if any, did housing affordability have for you?
2) Why has the city council decided to make developing affordable housing a top/low
priority?
-Do current residents demand that policy?
3) How high is the demand for affordable housing in --------?
4) What groups are most active in pushing for affordable housing development in --------?
-What role do businesses play?
-What role do residents play?
-What role do non-profit organizations play?
5) What are the primary obstacles to developing affordable housing in --------?
-Is it possible to develop affordable housing without subsidies?
-How extensive is resident opposition to affordable housing?
-Why do you think some residents appear to strongly desire affordable housing?
-How do environmental restrictions affect affordability?
6) (Questions relating to specific developments, policies, or portions of comprehensive
plan)
7) How does the city finance affordable housing development?
8) How much power does the city have to influence developers to include affordable
housing in their developments?
9) (Question related to tax base)
10) How would you compare resident opinions towards owner-occupied versus renteroccupied affordable housing?
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Appendix Three: Complete Correlation Matrix

Percent
affordable
of new
housing
units
Total
percent
affordable,
2000
Jobs
proximity
ratio
Supply
index
Tax
capacity
per capita,
2000
Percent
population
growth,
2000-2007
Adjacent
poverty
Adjacent
minority
Median
household
income,
2000
Median
owneroccupied
value,
2000
Median
rent, 2000

Percent
affordable
of new
housing
units
1

Total
percent
affordable,
2000

Jobs
proximity
ratio

Supply
index

Tax
capacity
per capita,
2000

Percent
population
growth,
2000-2007

Adjacent
poverty

Adjacent
minority

Median
household
income,
2000

Median
rent, 2000

-.294

Median
owneroccupied
value,
2000
-.402*

.413**

-.376*

-.349*

-.367*

.248

-.139

-.168

.413**

1

-.202

-.519**

-.745**

-.298

-.198

-.195

.730**

-.767**

-.551**

-.376*

-.202

1

.479**

.426**

-.476**

-.210

-.076

.081

.285

.234

-.349*

-.519**

.479**

1

.539**

-.026

.209

.257

.217

.514**

.167

-.367*

-.745**

.426**

.539**

1

-.071

.080

.043

.816**

.898**

.429**

.248

-.298

-.476**

-.026

-.071

1

.184

.202

.137

.016

-.077

-.139

-.198

-.168

-.195

-.210

.209

.080

.184

1

.784**

.100

.162

-.045

-.076

.257

.043

.202

.784**

1

.083

.123

.005

-.294

-.730**

.081

.217

.816**

.137

.100

.083

1

.890**

.465**

-.402

-.767**

.285

.514**

.898**

.016

.162

.123

.890**

1

.479**

-.227

-.551

.234

.167

.429**

-.077

-.045

.005

.465**

.479**

1

* Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
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